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“[H]e who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men.”1
Since important legal victories against racial discrimination and other 
forms of discrimination in the 1950s and 1960s, many legal scholars and 
lawyers have been increasingly attracted to the “romance of rights.”2  For 
these scholars and lawyers, analogies to the civil rights movement seem 
especially appealing as vehicles for achieving societal change in new 
fields. Animal Law is perhaps the fastest growing field of study in 
American legal education and scholarship, and calls for legal rights for some 
or all animals are rapidly expanding. This Article critiques comparisons 
between rights sought for animals and rights assigned to infant humans, 
mentally incapable adult humans, and corporations.  It argues that legal 
and societal reforms regarding animals are better suited to social contract—
contractualist—ideals than to creation of new rights.  Contrary to the 
increasingly frequent assertions of some animal rights theorists, appropriate 
treatment of animals in a manner that benefits society’s overall interests 
is attainable through focusing on human responsibility for animal welfare 
under social contract principles.  Developing an artificial construct of formal 
rights for animals would be harmful both to humans and, ultimately, to 
animals. 
I. INTRODUCTION
In legal discourse, rights are not what they used to be.  Their perceived 
scope is expanding.3  The rapidly broadening debate regarding animals’ 
legal status is illustrative. 
The 2008 annual meeting of the American Association of Law 
Schools (AALS) dedicated two separate panel discussions to questions 
of potential rights and personhood related to animals.4  The AALS 
annual meeting also witnessed adoption of proposed bylaws and election 
of proposed officers by a group of law professors seeking to form a new 
 1. IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 240 (Louis Infield trans., Harper 
Torchbooks 1963) (1780). 
 2. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 5 (1991).
3. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, Righting Wrongs, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1815–16 
(2000) (referencing some professors who feel that the traditional meaning of civil rights 
is insufficient to address modern problems and others who feel that redefining that term 
would jeopardize the entire social enterprise). 
4. See Association of American Law Schools, Reassessing Our Roles as Scholars 
and Educators in Light of Change (Jan. 5, 2008), http://www.aals.org/am2008/saturday/ 
index.html (presenting two discussion panels titled “The Margins of Legal Personhood” 
and “Debating Animals as Legal Persons and Gathering to Consider Formation as an 
AALS Section”). 
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AALS Section on Animal Law.  Approximately 280 full-time law professors 
signed a petition seeking formation of the new section.5  In June 2008, 
the AALS granted provisional approval of the new section.6
These developments join several other indicia that interest in animals’ 
legal status is growing explosively among legal academics and practitioners.  
As Cass Sunstein explained in 2004, “the animal rights question has 
moved from the periphery and toward the center of political and legal 
debate.”7  He also noted that the debate is “fully international”; for 
example, Germany became the first European nation to extend rights to 
animals in its constitution in 2002.8
In the United States, “animal law” may be the most rapidly developing 
field of study in legal academia.  As recently as the mid-1990s, only one 
or two United States law schools offered courses focusing on animal 
law.9  In just over a decade, the number of law schools that have offered 
or are planning to offer such courses has skyrocketed to at least ninety-
four.10  This includes courses at most elite law schools.11  In the past two 
years, no fewer than three new scholarly journals focusing exclusively 
on animal law have been established—Stanford University Law School’s 
Stanford Journal of Animal Law & Policy12 in 2007, the University of 
 5. E-mail from Joan Schaffner, Dir. of the Animal Law Program, George 
Washington Law Sch., to Animal Law Instructors, Member Law Schools of the Ass’n of 
Am. Law Sch. (Feb. 1, 2008) (on file with author).  A petition was circulated to create a 
section on Animal Law at the Association of American Law Schools’ annual conference 
in January 2008.  Id. Approximately two hundred eighty professors signed the petition, 
representing sixty-five member law schools.  Id. 
 6. E-mail from Joan Schaffner, Dir. of the Animal Law Program, George 
Washington Law Sch., to Animal Law Instructors, Member Law Schools of the Ass’n of 
Am. Law Sch. (June 3, 2008) (on file with author). 
 7. Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction: What Are Animal Rights?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS:
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 3, 4 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum 
eds., 2004).
8. Id.; see also John Hooper, German Parliament Votes to Give Animals 
Constitutional Rights, GUARDIAN (London), May 18, 2002, at 2. 
9. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Dubious Grail: Seeking Tort Law Expansion and 
Limited Personhood as Stepping Stones Toward Abolishing Animals’ Property Status, 60 
SMU L. REV. 3, 4 (2007).
10. See National Association for Biomedical Research, Animal Law Section, Animal 
Law Courses, http://www.nabrlaw.org/lawschools/animallawcourses/tabid/625/default.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2009); see also Animal Legal Defense Fund, Animal Law Courses, 
http://aldf.org/article.php?id=445 (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
11. See Cupp, supra note 9, at 4. 
12. See Stanford Law School, Journal of Animal Law and Policy, http:// 
sjalp.stanford.edu/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
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Pennsylvania Law School’s Journal of Animal Law and Ethics13 in 2007, 
and Michigan State University College of Law’s Journal of Animal Law in
2006.14  These join a fourth journal, the Animal Law Review, which was 
established in 1995.15
In recent years, the American Bar Association and numerous state and 
local bar associations have inaugurated new sections dedicated to animal 
law.16  The Animal Legal Defense Fund, which was a relatively small 
organization only a decade ago, now has established chapters in at least 
124 law schools, and claims to now have over 100,000 members.17
Growing interest in the field has also spread to Congress.  For example, 
in April 2008, a bill was introduced in the United States House of 
Representatives that would “prohibit the conducting of invasive research 
on great apes . . . .”18
As reflected in the 2008 AALS panel sessions addressing animals’ 
status, the intensifying discussion of humane treatment brought about or 
reflected by this meteoric growth is frequently couched in the language 
of rights.  News stories frequently describe advocates for humane 
treatment of animals as “animal rights activists.”19  The concept of “animal 
welfare activists” seems less familiar.20
13. See University of Pennsylvania Law School, Journal of Animal Law and 
Ethics, http://www.journalofanimallawandethics.com/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
14. See Michigan State University College of Law, Journal of Animal Law,
http://www.animallaw.info/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
15. See Lewis and Clark Law School, Animal Law Review, http://www.lclark. 
edu/org/animalaw/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2009); see also Cupp, supra note 9, at 4 n.5. 
16. See Cupp, supra note 9, at 4.
17. See Animal Legal Defense Fund, About Us, http://aldf.org/article.php?list= 
type&type=3 (last visited Feb. 2, 2009); see also Cupp, supra note 9, at 3, 4.  For a list of 
Student ALDF chapters, see Animal Legal Defense Fund, Student Animal Legal Defense 
Fund (SALDF) Chapters, http://aldf.org/article.php?id=446 (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
 18. Great Ape Protection Act, H.R. 5852, 110th Cong. (2008).  The House never 
did vote on the bill, which subsequently died at the end of 2008.  H.R. 5852: Great Ape 
Protection Act, Govtrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-5852 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2009).   
19. See, e.g., Ed Anderson, Cockfighting Bill ‘Guts’ La. Cruelty Statutes: Animal 
Rights Activists Decry Amendments, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 12, 2007, at 4 
(describing concerns regarding effect of legislation on current animal welfare law); see 
also David Crary, Asian Elephant’s Future at Stake as Ringling Battles Activists: First-
of-Its-Kind Lawsuit Pits Circus Giant Against Animal-Rights Activists, GRAND RAPIDS 
PRESS, June 4, 2006, at A3 (reporting on animal welfare organizations’ lawsuit against 
Barnum and Bailey for violations of the Endangered Species Act); Mick Dumke, 
Ruffling Feathers: Once Viewed as Crazies, Animal Rights Activists Say Their Message 
Is Starting to Get Through, CHI. TRIB., May 27, 2007, (Magazine), at 10 (describing 
recent trends in the animal rights movement). 
 20. Interestingly, however, some news accounts addressing animals’ interests have 
used this term.  See, e.g., Douglas Belkin, Seal Hunters Fight Long Cruelty Label, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 23, 2007, at B3 (stating animal welfare activists are infuriated by a coalition 
of Canadian sealers trying to revamp itself as environmentally friendly); see also Glenn 
Collins, For ‘Animal Precinct,’ Reality Subject to Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007, at 
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To many activists, the notion that animals should be afforded basic 
rights against cruelty and mistreatment seems manifest.21  Of course, the 
argument is not that animals should enjoy all rights that most humans 
enjoy, such as the right to vote.22  Rather, many activists view more basic 
animal interests—such as an interest in being free from unnecessary 
infliction of suffering—as rights.  Arguing for broad improvements in the 
treatment of animals often seems intertwined with arguing that animals 
should have basic rights against mistreatment.23
The popularity of the phrase animal rights activists rather than 
something like animal welfare activists reflects an increasing focus on 
animals as potential bearers of rights rather than on humans as bearers of 
responsibility for the welfare of animals they control.  This is consistent 
B1 (describing how some animal welfare advocates argue that hit reality show does not 
depict reality of anti-animal cruelty enforcement on the streets of New York); Carla Hall, 
Animal Shelters Under Scrutiny: Supervisors Look into Conditions After Three Civil 
Suits Are Filed, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at B1 (describing advocates for better animal 
shelter conditions as “animal welfare activists”); Robert Preer, Race to the Ballot: In 
Revived Campaign over Dog Tracks, Battleground Is Raynham, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13, 
2008, South, at 1 (detailing a public debate between animal welfare activists and 
greyhound dog racing); Angus Shaw, Pets Also Hit by Zimbabwe Crisis, CHI. TRIB., 
Sept. 23, 2007, at 16 (using animal welfare activists interchangeably with animal rights 
activists to describe efforts to prevent cruelty to animals in a meat-shortage stricken 
country).
21. See, e.g., Gary L. Francione, Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, 48 RUTGERS
L. REV. 397, 397, 398, 400 (1996) (discussing evolution of animal welfare movement 
and concept of animal rights); see also Beth Ann Madeline, Comment, Cruelty to 
Animals: Recognizing Violence Against Nonhuman Victims, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 307, 
309–15 (2000) (discussing evolution of anticruelty statutes). 
22. See, e.g., Alexander Gillespie, The Ethical Question in the Whaling Debate, 9
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 355, 378 (1997).  Gillespie notes: 
This strict comparison is an important point, as the claim is not that equal 
sentience leads to equal consideration in all matters, such as an animal’s right 
to vote.  Rather, that such a capacity leads to the necessity of weighing like 
interests equally.  Animals, unlike humans, clearly have no interest in voting 
but they do have an interest, as humans do, in avoiding pain. 
Id.
23. See, e.g., Steven M. Wise, Commentary, An Argument for the Basic Legal 
Rights of Farmed Animals, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 133, 136 (2008), 
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol106/wise.pdf (stating that “[t]o 
the degree that the animals we raise and kill for food also possess complex minds, the 
refusal to recognize their basic rights also offends the principle of equality,” namely, 
“that likes be treated alike”); see also Cassaundra Baber, The Lure of the Vegetarian 
Life, UTICA OBSERVER-DISPATCH, May 22, 2008, http://www.uticaod.com/archive/ 
x194403207/The-lure-of-the-vegetarian-life (stating that a young vegetarian will eat 
animal products “[w]hen she’s confident animals’ rights weren’t infringed upon . . . 
[and] she believes [they] are produced in an animal-friendly way”). 
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with the increasing focus on rights concepts and language generally that 
characterized the latter half of the twentieth century and continues into 
the present, and is also consistent with an arguably decreasing emphasis 
on public duties and responsibilities.  As Mary Ann Glendon noted, “To 
a great extent, the intellectual framework and the professional ethos of 
the entire current population of American lawyers have been infused 
with the romance of rights.”24  She adds that “[d]iscourse about rights has 
become the principal language that we use in public settings to discuss 
weighty questions of right and wrong . . . .”25
Fundamental rights are appropriately at the core of our values, but 
more is not always better.  Rights cannot expand without limits, and all 
rights entail costs.  Potential assertions of rights exist in competition.26
If an individual seeks to enter a neighbor’s home without consent, the 
homeowner’s private property rights conflict with and trump the 
intruder’s right to move about freely.  With an ever expanding list of 
problems addressed as rights issues, the significance of fundamental 
human rights is cheapened.27
This Article asserts that shifting the focus of animal welfare issues 
from human responsibility to animal rights provides a singular illustration 
of overburdening the rights paradigm.  Shifting focus away from human 
responsibility for animals’ welfare is harmful both for animals and for 
human society.  Part II of this Article addresses the rights paradigm’s 
expansion in societal discourse.  It documents the increasing attractiveness 
of rights language over the past sixty years and explores the foundations 
for this “romance” with the more-is-better view of rights.28
Part III confronts rising calls to assign basic rights to animals. It 
begins by addressing comparisons frequently made by advocates of 
animal rights between their struggle and the struggle against slavery and 
racial discrimination.  Such comparisons are highly problematic and are 
arguably offensive to many humans.  Part III also analyzes comparisons 
that animal rights advocates make between some animals and some 
entities for which rights are presently recognized.  Specifically, Part III 
analyzes comparisons between intelligent animals such as chimpanzees 
and nonhuman entities such as corporations and ships that are considered 
persons for some purposes in law.  Such comparisons have proven attractive 
to advocates of animal rights as potential precedents for assigning rights 
to nonhumans.  Part III considers and ultimately rejects such comparisons as 
 24. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 5. 
25. Id. at x.
26. See infra notes 281–301 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra notes 292–95 and accompanying text. 
28. See GLENDON, supra note 2, at 5.
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a basis for assigning rights to animals. This analysis begins by exploring the 
history of and competing theoretical bases for legal personhood for 
corporations, examining the artificial entity theory, the aggregate theory, 
and the real entity theory, and the nexus of contracts theory of corporate 
personhood. Part III concludes that all of these theories share a common 
theme: that corporate personhood is ultimately focused on humans.  
Corporations are proxies for human interests, and thus corporate personhood 
is an extension of human personhood. The same is true regarding the 
practice of admiralty courts in treating ships as persons in some contexts.  
This is not done because of abstract concern for the rights of ships; 
rather, ships are treated as proxies for their human owners. Of course 
unlike corporations and ships, animals are not fictitious surrogates for 
humans. 
Part IV asserts the centrality of humanity to rights. It begins by 
addressing the concept of personhood, and it presents the theory of 
contractualism as particularly useful in understanding why rights are, in 
practice, limited to humans and their proxies. Although theories of rights 
abound, contractualism resides closest to the foundations of our legal 
system and the common understandings and values that form the basis of 
our society.29 Beginning with studies of the American Revolution as 
children, Americans are taught to perceive rights in terms of the social 
contract, and rights are intertwined in common understanding with moral 
agency and responsibilities.30 Under this view, infants and mentally 
incapable adults are assigned rights because of their perceived closeness 
to humans with moral agency and responsibility, even if they do not at 
present possess those characteristics themselves.31 In exploring these 
issues and their implications for extending rights to animals, Part IV 
cautions against the trend to overstate similarities between humans and 
some intelligent animal species, such as great apes. 
Part V explores some of the costs that might be incurred in extending 
the rights paradigm to animals. Although accurately assessing all of 
these costs is not possible, Part V focuses on some related categories of 
potential costs that are particularly significant.  First, Part V addresses 
the possibility that creating animal rights may do as much to lower the 
status of humans as it does to raise the status of animals.32  Whereas the 
29. See infra notes 252–55 and accompanying text. 
30. See infra notes 243–44 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra notes 256–79 and accompanying text. 
32. See infra notes 282–91 and accompanying text. 
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intent may be to treat some animals more like humans, an effect of diluting 
rights status could be to treat some humans more like animals. 
A related concern is that the rights competition generated between 
animal rights and existing human rights raises the potential for disruptive 
economic and political upheaval.  For example, diminishing human property 
rights to make way for new animal rights could cause financial losses in 
agriculture, medicine, and clothing production.33  Ironically, the humans 
most powerfully disadvantaged by these new rights for animals would 
likely be those near the bottom of the world’s economic ladder, who 
often are deprived of basic human rights.  Further, human expressive rights, 
such as scientists’ First Amendment right to engage in scientific research, 
would be implicated.  Such rights competition, of course, does not by 
itself require a conclusion that rights is an inappropriate paradigm for 
animal welfare, but it must be considered as an important part of the 
question.
The Article concludes that rejecting the rights paradigm is not harmful 
to animals’ interests.  Indeed, it is ultimately more helpful to animals 
because it firmly designates and anchors responsibility where responsibility 
in reality lies: with humans.34  Indeed, centering on human responsibility 
may well be an appropriate reason to adopt some of the less extreme 
animal protections sought by animal “rights” activists.  However, for the 
welfare of both humans and animals, focus must remain on the reality of 
human moral agency and obligation rather than on the fantasy of animals 
as appropriate bearers of rights. 
II. THE EXPANDING RIGHTS PARADIGM IN SOCIETAL DISCOURSE
Rights is a “loaded term” in legal philosophy that “can be considered 
in many ways.”35  Consensus on the nature of rights or even agreement 
on how rights should be defined is elusive.  However, there is appropriate 
popular consensus that some fundamental rights, such as the right to 
freedom of expression, are at the core of liberty.36  The United States 
Constitution’s Bill of Rights provides an essential foundation of the 
nation’s identity.37
33. See infra notes 296–98 and accompanying text.
34. See infra note 310 and accompanying text. 
 35. Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend: The Moral and 
Legal Status of Companion Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 78 (2002). 
36. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 431–40 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789), reprinted in
DOUGLAS W. KMIEC ET AL., INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 30 
(2d ed. 2004) (citing James Madison as stating that the “freedom of the press, as one of 
the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable”).
37. See EDWARD J. LARSON, A MAGNIFICENT CATASTROPHE: THE TUMULTUOUS
ELECTION OF 1800, AMERICA’S FIRST PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 16–17 (2007).  The need 
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Allowing slavery to survive creation of the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights tainted American ideals from the nation’s inception, and of 
course the toxic effects of this injustice are still evident in the present.  
After a bloody civil war ended slavery but did not end state-sanctioned 
racial discrimination, distrust of existing democratic processes as a means of 
achieving racial justice became increasingly entrenched.38  Particularly 
in the South, disenfranchisement produced all-white governments radically 
opposed to reform.  Alabama governor George Wallace’s political theater in 
dramatically pronouncing “[s]egregation now, segregation tomorrow, 
segregation forever” in opposition to federal court-ordered integration at 
the University of Alabama was playing to his base; he knew that at that 
time the state and local political arena in Alabama belonged overwhelmingly 
to whites.39
As the civil rights movement gathered steam in the 1950s and 1960s 
and encountered resistance from elected officials, activists increasingly 
looked to courts rather than elections—at least state and local elections—as 
a primary vehicle for reform.40  Especially in the South, racist elected 
for incorporating the enumerated rights of the people in the Constitution was integral to 
both the Federalists and Antifederalists.  The support of both John Adams and Thomas 
Jefferson, the two prominent ideologues on each side, was critical for ratification, and 
both found it necessary that the Constitution include a bill of rights.  Id.  “‘You are afraid 
of the one—I, the few,’ Adams wrote to Jefferson in 1787.  ‘We agree that the many 
should have full, fair, and perfect representation.  You are apprehensive of monarchy; I, 
of aristocracy.’”  Id. at 17. 
 38. Reuel E. Schiller, The Emporium Capwell Case: Race, Labor Law, and the 
Crisis of Post-War Liberalism, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 129, 131 (2004) (noting 
that after World War II, egalitarianism in the form of “racial justice and individual 
liberties . . . increased . . . .  [However,] [t]hese commitments did not always jibe with 
participatory, democratic sentiments. . . .  Too often, democratic processes yielded 
results that were inconsistent with liberalism’s desire to protect the rights of individuals 
and racial minorities”). 
39. See Richard Pearson, Ex-Gov. George C. Wallace Dies at 79: Alabaman 
Personified ‘60s Opposition to Civil Rights Movement, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1998, at 
A1.  The article recalls Wallace’s famous declaration following in the wake of receiving 
the largest gubernatorial popular vote in Alabama history after campaigning on an 
aggressively ethnocentric platform, and notes that, ironically, when effective 
disenfranchisement ended and whites no longer dominated state politics to the extent 
they had in the past, Wallace effectively shifted his tactics to court votes from African-
Americans.  Id.
40. See HARRELL R. RODGERS, JR. & CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III, LAW AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE: CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 17–23, 37–40 (1972) 
(discussing the lack of African-American confidence in the electoral system due to 
disenfranchisement, vote dilution, and the lack of pro-civil rights candidates); see also 
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN 
THE UNITED STATES 258 (2000) (“Mayors and governors refused to integrate schools and 
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judges and all-white juries made reliance on even the courts problematic.41
Civil rights activists learned that federal court judges applying the 
United States Constitution or federal civil rights laws were more likely 
to provide racial justice than were juries or the stacked-deck political 
arena.42
Both the Civil Rights Act of 196443 and the federal court lawsuits that 
empowered the civil rights movement spoke, eloquently and effectively, 
in the language of rights. The rights asserted—freedom from irrational 
discrimination by government in the form of racial discrimination—
were of course central to human dignity and justice.  Over time, a 
societal consensus developed that such claims entailed fundamental 
public facilities; legislatures declared that they would not dismantle Jim Crow . . . .  
Meanwhile, the fortunes of liberal or populist white politicians who displayed any 
sympathy with blacks . . . were spiraling into decline.”); Gerald M. Stern, Judge William 
Harold Cox and the Right to Vote in Clarke County, Mississippi, in SOUTHERN JUSTICE
165, 165–68 (Leon Friedman ed., 1965) (giving a first-hand account of one of the first 
voting discrimination cases brought by the United States). 
 41. In 1955, two white men were tried in Mississippi for abducting, murdering, 
and mutilating a young African-American teenager for allegedly making a suggestive 
remark to a white woman.  An all white jury acquitted the men despite strong evidence 
of guilt.  William Bradford Huie, The Shocking Story of Approved Killing in Mississippi,
LOOK, Jan. 24, 1956, reprinted in THE LYNCHING OF EMMETT TILL: A DOCUMENTARY 
NARRATIVE 200, 200–08 (Christopher Metress ed., 2002).  Similarly, in 1964, three civil 
rights activists were murdered in Mississippi when a local sheriff stopped their car only 
to release them into the Ku Klux Klan’s custody.  HOWARD BALL, JUSTICE IN MISSISSIPPI:
THE MURDER TRIAL OF EDGAR RAY KILLEN 35–46 (2006).  The U.S. Department of 
Justice and the FBI were forced to pursue their own investigation, due to the lack of 
cooperation from Mississippi.  Id. The Governor suggested that the activists were 
enjoying the nightlife of Havana, Cuba, while a Mississippi Senator insisted that the 
activists’ disappearance was merely a “publicity stunt.”  Id. at 38. Of the eighteen 
Klansmen finally charged with conspiracy to murder, an all-white jury found only seven 
guilty, all of whom were released less than a decade later.  Id. at 46. In 2005, forty years 
after the murders, Mississippi finally charged and convicted Edgar Ray Killen, the Klan 
ringleader of the murders, on three counts of murder.  Id.  Killen’s conviction was 
Mississippi’s only prosecution for the murders.  Id.; see also Shaila Dewan, Ex-Klansman 
Guilty of Manslaughter in 1964 Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2005, at A1, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F03EFD9113BF931A15755C0A9639C
8B63.
42. See RODGERS & BULLOCK, supra note 40, at 24.  A study conducted from 1954 
to 1963 reported that African-American plaintiffs won only twenty-nine percent of cases 
involving race in southern state courts but fifty-one percent of the cases in southern 
federal district courts.  Id. at 51; see also RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE 
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR 
EQUALITY 265 (2d ed. 2004) (“[S]ince most of the municipal, county, and state courts, 
particularly in the South, were unfavorably disposed toward the African American’s 
aching grievances, NAACP lawyers and other counsel to black litigants were becoming 
deeply enmeshed in the [federal] appeal process.”); Michael Meltsner, Southern 
Appellate Courts: A Dead End, in SOUTHERN JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 136, 136–54. 
 43. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 101, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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freedoms to which all citizens are entitled.44  This developing societal 
consensus that the rights paradigm must be expanded was laudable, even 
heroic, in recognizing fundamental freedoms at the core of liberty.  In 
this context, expanding rights spectacularly succeeded, and in the 
process, rights language rose in stature.  Societal consensus that the 
costs of this rights expansion were negligible in comparison with its 
benefits ensured that many or most Americans could enjoy a relatively 
unmitigated positive reaction to the change.45  Rights concepts increasingly 
came to be thought of as a vehicle for societal reform, and since the civil 
rights movement, rights concepts have continued to rise in prominence 
as an answer to societal ills in general. 
This trend received a significant boost through the Warren Court’s 
extension of many parts of the Bill of Rights to action by state 
governments.  Prior to the latter half of the twentieth century, lawsuits 
invoking the United States Constitution tended to focus on the limits of 
federal authority versus state authority, and the division of power within 
the federal government—for example, the scope of executive power 
versus Congress’s power.46  Under this paradigm, it is not surprising that 
the constitutional law experts of the New Deal centered their attention 
on “the overall design of government and to the functions and relations 
among its specialized organs,” rather than on individual rights.47
Over time, however, and perhaps fueled by the inadequacy of state 
political processes in the South to remedy systematic deprivations of 
civil rights discussed above, the Supreme Court developed the incorporation 
doctrine.  Under this doctrine, the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates 
44. See KLUGER, supra note 42, at 711–14 (discussing the nation’s reaction to 
Brown v. Board of Education and other similar cases); see also Michael J. Klarman, 
Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 453–58 (2005) (tracing 
the national reaction to Brown v. Board of Education).
 45. For example, as the justness of the cause of racial civil rights gained broad 
acceptance, relatively few Americans would have felt it appropriate to complain that 
equality for African-Americans in the job market would interfere with the advantage in 
the job market racial discrimination allowed for whites.  Incurring the “cost” of whites 
having to compete on a more even playing field is so consistent with notions of justice 
that even considering it as a cost seems inappropriate. 
46. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 165–66, 169–74 (8th ed. 2004); 
JOHN BRAEMAN, BEFORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: THE OLD COURT AND 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 5 (1988) (“[T]he justices grappled with . . . the scope of presidential 
and congressional war powers; the transformed relationship between the states and the 
national government; . . . [and] how far business should be protected against government 
regulation . . . .”); GLENDON, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
 47. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 5. 
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the rights recognized by the Bill of Rights’ first eight Amendments, thus 
preventing state governments from violating the rights guaranteed under 
the first eight Amendments.48  Creating the incorporation doctrine had 
the effect of dramatically expanding the scope of individual rights 
litigation under the Federal Constitution.  State and local government is 
much more involved in the everyday lives of citizens than is the federal 
government, and constitutionalizing claims of rights violations by state 
and local government provided endless new possibilities for constitutional 
rights litigation.49  In the wake of this development, at present, “the bulk 
of the Court’s constitutional work involves claims that individual rights 
have been violated.”50
Although this evolution may have its roots in the glory of the civil 
rights movement’s call for racial equality, its expansion into other areas 
continues.  Many of these expansions have been, with varying degrees of 
credibility, promoted as extensions of the principles of justice and 
equality that illuminated the civil rights movement.  For example, the 
movement to seek equal rights for women was not generated by the 
struggle for racial civil rights, but connections between the two are 
apparent, and the struggle for gender equality was aided by successes in 
the struggle for racial equality.51
The same may be said of the movement for expanded rights for 
children.  Until relatively recent times, children were viewed at least 
technically as property under the law in many contexts.52  Child protection 
statutes began taking hold in the 1800s, and spread to all states in the 
twentieth century.53  However, children’s rights seemed to expand 
further in the wake of the civil rights movement’s general expansion of 
48. Id. at 4; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY
386–92 (2005); DOUGLAS W. KMIEC ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER:
HISTORY, CASES, AND PHILOSOPHY 748–90, 1157–92 (2d ed. 2004); HAROLD J. SULLIVAN, CIVIL
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES: PROVOCATIVE QUESTIONS AND EVOLVING ANSWERS 9–15 (2001). 
 49. AMAR, supra note 48, at 391 (“Every . . . citizen would be entitled to claim a 
host of fundamental rights and freedoms (including the right to equality) against his or 
her own home state.”); GLENDON, supra note 2, at 5. 
 50. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 5; see also BAUM, supra note 46, at 163, 165–67.
51. See Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview 
of Women’s Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century,
88 CAL. L. REV. 2017, 2048–50 (2000). 
52. See Annette Ruth Appell, Representing Children Representing What?: Critical 
Reflections on Lawyering for Children, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 573, 577 n.8 
(2008); Cupp, supra note 9, at 23. 
53. See DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN §§ 1:2–4, 16:1–2 (2d ed. 
rev. 2005).  For a historical narrative of child protection efforts in America, see generally 
Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal 
Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293, 294–333 (1972). 
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the rights paradigm.  For example, in the early 1970s, some courts began 
allowing children to assert tort claims against their parents.54
Advocates of sexual expression rights followed with interest the 
expansion of rights in other areas.  Inspired by successful efforts to 
further racial equality, gay rights activists increasingly found their voices 
and spoke the language of rights.  In Bowers v. Hardwick55 in 1986 and 
in Lawrence v. Texas56 in 2003, the Supreme Court addressed equal 
protection and due process rights in the context of sexual orientation, 
with increasing deference for conceptualizing consensual sexual expression 
as a protected right.57
In recent years, arguments for a right of marriage for homosexuals 
have taken on particular prominence, both in the media58 and in the 
courts.59  In May 2008, the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re 
Marriage Cases60 garnered national attention in holding that the privacy 
and due process provisions of the California State Constitution guarantee 
the basic civil right of marriage to all individuals and couples, regardless 
of sexual orientation.61  The Court also held that the California Family 
54. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 653–54 (Cal. 1971) (abolishing 
parental tort immunity in California by permitting an unemancipated child to sue his 
parent for negligence in operating an automobile). 
 55. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that Georgia’s sodomy statute did not 
violate the fundamental rights of homosexuals). 
 56. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute making it a crime for 
two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violated 
homosexuals’ right to liberty under the Due Process Clause).
57. See DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS: FROM BOWERS TO 
LAWRENCE AND BEYOND 88–100 (2005); Ariela R. Dubler, From McLaughlin v. Florida
to Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual Freedom and the Road to Marriage, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1165, 1186–87 (2006). 
58. See C.W. Nevius, Time Favors Gay-Marriage Proponents, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 
10, 2005, at B1; Tim Padgett, Gay Family Values, TIME, July 16, 2007, at 51, 51–52; 
Jonathan Rauch, A More Perfect Union: How the Founding Fathers Would Have 
Handled Gay Marriage, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 2004, at 88, available at http://www. 
theatlantic.com/doc/200404/gay-marriage; Jonathan Saltzman, Same-Sex Marriage 
Battle Rages On: Boston Based Group Looks to Expand Rights, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 5, 
2007, at B1; Russell Shorto, What’s Their Real Problem with Gay Marriage? It’s the 
Gay Part, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 19, 2005, at 34, 36–41; Editorial, The Road to Gay 
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, § 4, at 12. 
59. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 50–51 (Haw. 1993); Goodridge v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948–49 (Mass. 2003); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 
196, 200 (N.J. 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5–6 (N.Y. 2006); Baker v. 
State, 744 A.2d 864, 867–68 (Vt. 1999); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 968–
69 (Wash. 2006). 
60. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
61. Id. at 399. 
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Code provision that limits marriage to a union “between a man and a 
woman,” and states that “only marriage between a man and a woman is 
valid or recognized in California” violates the state constitution’s equal 
protection clause, and encroaches on fundamental privacy rights of 
same-sex couples.62
In November 2008, a California ballot initiative titled Proposition 8 
effectively overruled In re Marriage Cases through a state constitutional 
amendment banning same-sex marriage.63  Activists plan to challenge 
the legality of Proposition 8, taking the battle into the courts.64  Supporters 
of the In re Marriage Cases decision⎯and gay rights advocates in 
general⎯often point to the civil rights movement as both a roadmap for 
their cause and as a source of inspiration.65
The rights revolution that was so important to advancing racial 
equality has spread further than these most familiar areas.  For example, 
a rising interest in “consumer rights” developed alongside the civil rights 
movement.  As with civil rights, courts spearheaded the consumer rights 
revolution.  Expansive new civil liability rules for defective products in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s based on jettisoning traditional privity 
limitations and on the new concept of strict liability in tort placed 
dramatic new emphasis on safety rights of consumers.66  Ralph Nader’s 
landmark book Unsafe at Any Speed67 caught the nation’s mood in 1965 
and launched Nader into national prominence as an advocate for 
consumer rights.68  Political manifestation of consumers’ rights followed 
the courts’ lead.  For example, Congress established the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission in 1972 to limit accidents caused by unreasonably 
unsafe products.69
62. Id. at 400, 402. 
63. See Michael Rothfeld & Tony Barboza, Governor Backs Gay Marriage, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2008, at B1. 
64. Id.
65. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE 
FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 1–4,7–9, 129–30, 134–47 (2002); DAVID A. J. RICHARDS,
IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS: RACE, GENDER, RELIGION AS ANALOGIES 6–38 
(1999); RICHARDS, supra note 57, at 100–27, 133–35; Randall Kennedy, Marriage and 
the Struggle for Gay, Lesbian, and Black Liberation, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 781, 791–92; 
Adele M. Morrison, Same-Sex Loving: Subverting White Supremacy Through Same-Sex 
Marriage, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 177, 184–92 (2007).
66. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901–02 (Cal. 1962) 
(creating a new cause of action for strict liability in tort); Henningsen v. Bloomfield 
Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 99–102 (N.J. 1960) (eroding contractual privity limitations in 
implied warranty of merchantability lawsuits involving injured consumers). 
67. See RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE 
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE, at vii–x (1965). 
68. See JUSTIN MARTIN, NADER: CRUSADER, SPOILER, ICON 46–47, 62 (2002). 
 69. U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.cpsc.gov/about/faq.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
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Presently, many areas of agitation for societal reform may be, and 
often are, presented as a matter of extending rights.  Advocates speak of 
nonsmokers’ rights, of smokers’ rights, of students’ rights, of parents’ 
rights, of grandparents’ rights, of prisoners’ rights, of disability rights, of 
immigrants’ rights, of the right to die, of the right to life, of the right to 
choose abortion, and of any number of other asserted rights,70 including, 
of course, animal rights. 
One might speculate as to whether the rise in wealth in the middle 
classes and the United States’ seemingly bright future in the years 
following World War II contributed to an increasing emphasis on the 
individual.71  Perhaps a particularly good economic outlook and national 
self-confidence allowed more energy to be expended seeking personal 
self-fulfillment and personal rights.  Perhaps also increasing employment 
opportunities for African-Americans and women necessitated by labor 
shortages during World War II provided heightened awareness regarding 
the imperative of equal treatment.72
Whatever the causes, the postwar era, especially the 1960s, generated 
a new mindset in the United States.  Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” 
significantly expanded welfare and social programs with the goals of 
furthering equality and protecting individuals who had been left behind 
during a time of optimism and national prosperity.73  Dubbed the “Me 
Generation” by critics,74 youth in the 1960s famously valued individuality 
and emancipation from traditional societal restrictions at a level not 
previously experienced in the United States.75  These political and societal 
developments both reflected and encouraged the increasing emphasis on 
 70. Perhaps this would include even the right to entertainment.  A popular song in 
the 1980s reflected the ubiquitousness of the rights paradigm in society with an emphatic 
insistence that “you’ve got to fight, for your right, to party.”  BEASTIE BOYS, Fight for 
Your Right, on LICENSED TO ILL (Def Jam 1986).
71. See Arthur M. Johnson, Economy Since 1914, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 110, 120–26 (Glenn Porter ed., 1980). 
72. See JACQUELINE JONES, AMERICAN WORK: FOUR CENTURIES OF BLACK AND 
WHITE LABOR 345–55 (1998). 
73. See generally JOHN A. ANDREW III, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE GREAT SOCIETY
3–33 (1998) (outlining the principles of Johnson’s Great Society). 
74. See LANDON Y. JONES, GREAT EXPECTATIONS: AMERICA AND THE BABY BOOM 
GENERATION 254 (1980) (“For most of human history, people had thought that life was 
hard, brutal, and tragic.  But the baby boom’s early affluence developed in it . . . ‘the 
psychology of entitlement.’  What other generations have thought privileges, the baby 
boomers thought were rights.”). 
75. See DOMINICK CAVALLO, FICTION OF THE PAST: THE SIXTIES IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 97, 116 (1999).
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an individual rights paradigm as a vehicle for addressing conflicts and 
seeking reform. 
This Article’s analysis is not directed toward criticizing human rights 
that have been extended—and are still being sought—on the basis of 
race, gender, disability, sexual orientation, or any other grounds.  Indeed, 
much of the increasing emphasis on individual human rights has been 
needed, with the struggles for racial and gender equality standing out as 
the most obvious but not the only examples.  Rather than broadly attacking 
rights emphasis per se, this analysis is intended to provide context and 
background for current arguments that animal welfare issues should be 
viewed as a question of rights.  Given the “romance of rights” in recent 
years that has manifested itself in a variety of ways,76 an impulse to view 
problems involving animal welfare under this paradigm is not surprising.  
Animal welfare issues, however, are fundamentally different from the 
expanding rights issues addressed above.  Every other significant area of 
potential rights expansion is argued in terms of advancing human dignity 
and freedom.  Arguments for animal rights are the first serious efforts to 
consciously divorce rights concepts from a focus on humanity.77
III. RISING CALLS TO ASSIGN RIGHTS TO ANIMALS
The animal rights movement has existed for many years, but it has 
changed dramatically in the past decade.  Early activists focused on 
animal welfare rather than rights.78  Organizations dedicated to opposing 
cruelty to animals began forming in the 1800s and had broad success in 
lobbying for states to enact anticruelty laws.79  Eventually every American 
76. See GLENDON, supra note 2, at 5. 
 77. “Computer rights”—rights for computers that attain a level of artificial 
intelligence comparable in some ways to human intelligence—have been discussed as an 
abstract concept, but no significant groups are actively lobbying for an extension of 
computer rights given the wide gap that still exists between computer intelligence and 
human intelligence.  See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences,
70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1255–81 (1992); see also MARVIN MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF MIND
25–30, 186–94 (1986); STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS 
FOR ANIMALS 156–58 (2000) (reflecting on whether some day computers may attain 
consciousness); Cupp, supra note 9, at 19–20 (noting that if animals are assigned rights 
based on intelligence, rights for computers may require consideration on the same basis 
at some point); Richard A. Posner, Animal Rights, 110 YALE L.J. 527, 531 (2000) 
(reviewing WISE, supra, and noting that one day computers and chimpanzees will be 
“wired” similarly and will have similar numbers of “neurons”).  Hollywood has also 
addressed implications of evolving levels of artificial intelligence in movies such as AI 
and I, Robot.
 78. Huss, supra note 35, at 52–53.
79. See DAVID FAVRE & PETER L. BORCHELT, ANIMAL LAW AND DOG BEHAVIOR 
258–59 (1999); Huss, supra note 35, at 52–53. 
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jurisdiction enacted some form of animal protection.80  However, judges 
often assumed that “their purpose was to protect human morals, not 
animal bodies.”81
In 1975, philosopher Peter Singer published his landmark book 
Animal Liberation,82 which inspired a growing group of activists to think 
in terms of rights for animals.  However, many early rights activists lacked 
legal sophistication.  Singer is a philosopher rather than a legal scholar, 
and his work reflects his training.83  Many early arguments for animal 
rights focused on moral, ethical, and philosophical grounds rather than 
on legal analysis.84  Concrete legal doctrines and principles were not at 
the forefront of the struggle. 
By the 1970s, the civil rights movement was well underway, and, as it 
did for other areas in which expanded rights were sought,85 the movement 
provided an example of success and perhaps something of a roadmap.  
Rebecca Huss notes that “[s]everal animal rights activists make analogies to 
slavery and the civil rights struggles of the last century.”86  Richard 
Ryder, who is credited with coining the term speciesism to describe 
perceived human chauvinism in ignoring the rights of other species, has 
explained that, after the attacks upon racism and sexism, it seemed only 
logical to attack speciesism.87  As animal rights activists have developed 
an increasing focus on law and on legal rights, they increasingly have 
compared the movement for animals’ rights to the movements for both 
racial and gender equality rights. 
80. See WISE, supra note 77, at 44. 
81. Id.
 82. PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION, at vii–xiii (new rev. ed. 1990).  Despite 
serving as an inspiration for many advocates of “rights” for animals, in this work, Singer 
seems to express a preference for language of “equality” rather than rights; he describes 
rights language as “a convenient political shorthand.”  Id. at 8. 
83. See Cupp, supra note 9, at 3–4 (noting Singer’s impact on the early animal 
rights movement). 
84. See generally STANLEY GODLOVITCH ET AL., ANIMALS, MEN AND MORALS: AN
ENQUIRY INTO THE MALTREATMENT OF NON-HUMANS 150–67 (1972). 
85. See supra notes 51–69 and accompanying text. 
 86. Huss, supra note 35, at 67.  Some philosophers analogized the struggle for 
animal rights to the much earlier struggle to abolish slavery.  For example, in 1781, 
Philosopher Jeremy Bentham “suggest[ed] that mistreatment of animals was akin to 
racial discrimination . . . .”  Sunstein, supra note 7, at 3; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 310–11 (Prometheus Books 1988) (1781).
 87. Richard D. Ryder, Speciesism in the Laboratory, in IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS
77, 77 (Peter Singer ed., 1985). 
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The writings of Steven Wise, perhaps the most prominent legal 
apologist for extending rights to at least some animals,88 are illustrative 
of analogies to the struggle against slavery and its aftermath that 
demonstrate an increasing emphasis on achieving rights through the 
courts.  Although he has taught Animal Law at Harvard Law School and 
at other law schools, Wise is also a practicing attorney.  Describing 
himself as an “animal protection lawyer,” he specializes in cases involving 
animals, and is an advocate of assigning personhood, and thus rights, to 
particularly intelligent animals.89
In his influential90 2000 book Rattling the Cage,91 Wise relies on two 
cases that address slavery to “set the stage”92 for his argument to assign 
personhood to intelligent animals—Somerset v. Stewart93 and Dred Scott 
v. Sandford.94 Somerset was a pivotal 1772 English case in which the 
lawyer for a slave seeking freedom asked the court “upon what Principle 
is it—can a Man become a Dog for another Man[?]”95  The court’s 
decision freeing the slave led to the abolition of slavery in England.96
Wise emphasizes the court’s holding that a strong moral imperative 
against slavery required the court to act regardless of the potential for 
serious economic consequences—presumably as an analogy to the 
modern argument that a strong moral imperative requires assigning 
rights to some animals even if this might entail serious economic 
consequences.97
The 1857 Dred Scott case, better known to Americans, is ignominious.  
Finding in the tense period just before the Civil War that blacks are 
“beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the 
 88. Although critical of his conclusions, Judge Richard Posner describes Wise as 
“the leading legal advocate of animal rights.”  Richard A. Posner, Animal Rights: Legal, 
Philosophical, and Pragmatic Perspectives, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 51, 51. 
 89. STEVEN M. WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL 
RIGHTS xi (2002). 
90. Rattling the Cage was favorably reviewed by prominent constitutional law 
scholar Cass Sunstein in the New York Times Book Review.  Cass R. Sunstein, The
Chimps’ Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Feb. 20, 2000, at 26, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/pages/books/ (enter “The Chimps’ Day in Court” into the 
search pane).  The book was also reviewed by Judge Richard Posner.  Posner, supra note 
77, at 527–29. 
91. See generally WISE, supra note 77. 
92. Id. at 49. 
 93. (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (K.B.). 
 94. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404–08 (1857).
 95. William M. Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery 
in the Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 86, 90 (1974) (quoting Transcript of 
Oral Argument, Granville Sharpe Transcripts, New York Historical Society, Somerset v. 
Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (K.B.)). 
96. See Cupp, supra note 9, at 21. 
97. See WISE, supra note 77, at 49–50; see also Cupp, supra note 9, at 21–22. 
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white race,”98 Chief Justice Roger Taney held that they could be “treated 
as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could 
be made by it.”99  Wise uses this case to demonstrate that living beings 
found by law to be things—African-Americans in 1857, and animals at 
present—are not granted legal capacity to sue under the law.100
Wise argues that humans long ago began applying what we had 
learned about domesticating wild animals to enslave each other.101  He 
further asserts: 
[A]s our domestication of wild animals served as an unprincipled model for our 
enslavement of human beings, so the destruction of human slavery and all its 
badges can model the principled destruction of chimpanzee and bonobo slavery.  
Determining the dignity-rights of chimpanzees and bonobos in accordance with 
fundamental principles of Western law— equality, liberty, and reasoned judicial 
decisionmaking—reemphasizes and reinvigorates these principles just as the 
abolition of slavery and its badges did.102
Although slavery and the civil rights movement are probably many 
animal rights activists’ most frequently used analogies, other successful 
rights movements are analogized as well.  For example, one writer stated 
that “what has happened over the years is that there have been a lot of 
strategic and savvy people who have been able to use various notions 
like rights . . . to move things forward and to have progress. . . .  [W]e saw it 
with women’s rights.  We saw it with children’s rights and we’re seeing 
it with animal rights . . . .”103
Drawing a parallel between the struggle to attain rights for historically 
oppressed categories of humans and the struggle to attain rights for 
animals is controversial and is offensive to some.  Some opponents of 
rights for animals “find the analogy of the development of rights of 
African-Americans and women to the development of rights for animals 
inappropriate, as well as distasteful.”104  Although no offense is intended 
98. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407. 
99. Id.
100. See WISE, supra note 77, at 61 (“It turned out that Scott had no legal capacity, 
and therefore no power, to sue in a federal court.  One hundred and forty years later, 
another federal judge said that Kama [a dolphin Mr. Wise asserted to represent in a 
lawsuit] had no legal capacity either.”). 
101. Id. at 261.
102. Id.
 103. Colloquy, The Legal Status of Nonhuman Animals, 8 ANIMAL L. 1, 15 (2002) 
(remarks of Helena Silverstein). 
104. See Huss, supra note 35, at 68.  Cass Sunstein also makes this point, noting 
that “[f]ew people accept that particular analogy [between animal mistreatment and 
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with such comparisons, one need not be an opponent of animal rights to 
find them troubling.  The struggle for human rights is broadly perceived 
as being among humanity’s most important endeavors.  Speaking about 
animal rights and human rights in the same breath and with the same 
fervor may be perceived as raising the status of animals, but it equally 
may be perceived as lowering the status of humans.  This demonstrates 
one of the fundamental challenges to arguments for extending rights to 
animals, rather than focusing on humans’ responsibility to act humanely 
toward animals.  If animals are placed in the same category as persons, 
human dignity may be diminished as much as animal dignity is—in 
theory—enhanced.105  Further, thinking of humans in the same way as 
one thinks of animals does not further the premise of human responsibility, 
which is the foundation upon which any hope of improved treatment of 
animals must ultimately rely.106
In addition to comparing the animal rights movement to historic 
movements to broaden human rights, some animal rights theorists highlight 
situations in which courts have assigned rights to other types of nonhuman 
entities and to humans with less intellectual attainment than some 
animals.  Specifically, some activists note that courts have recognized a 
form of legal personhood for corporations, ships, infant humans, and 
mentally incapable adult humans.107
Those asserting that rights should be assigned to animals are divided 
as to which animals should receive those rights.  Some activists argue 
that animals should be assigned rights if they have the capacity to 
suffer.108  Others argue that—at least as a first step—assertions of rights 
human slavery]; many people find it offensive.”  Sunstein, supra note 7, at 4.  Although 
Sunstein may be correct among the population at large that relatively few people accept 
the analogy to slavery, it appears to be a fairly common point of emphasis among many 
animal rights activists.  For further criticism, see David R. Schmahmann & Lori J. 
Polacheck, The Case Against Rights for Animals, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 747, 
780–81 (1994), noting that: 
While it may be true that in the context of the relatively brief span of American 
history the experience of women and African-Americans has been one of 
ascending from subordination to relative political empowerment, it does not 
follow that political empowerment is a constantly expanding process, destined 
eventually to empower not only animals but even other entities not yet fully 
identified. 
Id.
105. See infra notes 292–95 and accompanying text. 
106. See infra note 310 and accompanying text. 
107. See infra notes 132–201 and accompanying text. 
108. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal 
Rights), 47 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1363 (2000) (“The capacity to suffer is . . . a sufficient 
basis for legal rights for animals); see also BENTHAM, supra note 86, at 311 (“[T]he 
question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”); SINGER,
supra note 82, at 238 (noting that Richard Wasserstrom’s article Rights, Human Rights 
and Racial Discrimination states that there is a human right to well-being and “that to 
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should only focus on animals with particularly high intelligence—
intelligence comparable in some ways with human children.109  Steven 
Wise is a leader among those arguing that animal intelligence should be 
an important consideration in deciding whether to assign rights.  He 
argues for this approach on pragmatic grounds, asserting that efforts to 
attain rights are most likely to succeed if they are focused on particularly 
intelligent animals that are the most like humans.110  Wise focuses his 
analysis of animal intelligence on “practical autonomy”; he argues that 
deny someone relief from acute physical pain makes it impossible for that person to live 
a full or satisfying life”).  Singer notes that this benefit can be enjoyed by nonhumans as 
nonhumans experience pain; thus, “if human beings have a right to relief from acute 
physical pain, . . . [a]nimals would have it too” because they can suffer and feel pain.  Id.
 109. See, for example, Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, in IN DEFENSE OF
ANIMALS, supra note 87, at 13, 16–17, 23, who notes: 
Well, perhaps some will say that animals have some inherent value, only less 
than we have.  Once again, however, attempts to defend this view can be shown to 
lack rational justification.  What could be the basis of our having more inherent 
value than animals?  Their lack of reason, or autonomy, or intellect?  Only if 
we are willing to make the same judgment in the case of humans who are 
similarly deficient.  But it is not true that such humans—the retarded child, for 
example, or the mentally deranged—have less inherent value than you or I.  
Neither, then, can we rationally sustain the view that animals like them in 
being the experiencing subjects of a life have less inherent value.  All who
have inherent value have it equally, whether they be human animals or not. 
Id.  See also Steven Best, Legally Blind: The Case for Granting Animals Legal Rights,
IMPACT PRESS, Aug.–Sept. 2002, http://www.impactpress.com/articles/augsep02/blind8902. 
html, who argues: 
It is a flagrant contradiction to grant a severely impaired human being 
personhood but deny it to a more intelligent and aware ape, or any other 
complex animal.  If entities such as corporations can be considered as a “person” in 
the courts, it shouldn’t be too far a stretch to treat an animal as such. 
Id. Finally, see Josie Glausiusz, Steven Wise He Speaks for the Speechless, DISCOVER 
MAG., Sept. 1, 2001, http://discovermagazine.com/2001/sep/breakdialogue, who quotes 
Steven Wise as saying: 
According to an ancient rule of equality, you are entitled to basic legal rights if 
you are similar to another creature who has those basic legal rights.  Say a 
baby is born in a hospital without a brain.  Judges give that little girl the right 
to bodily integrity.  On the other hand, a bonobo like Kanzi [a chimp who has 
been trained to communicate using symbols] can understand in excess of 3000 
human words, can probably count, and functions at the level of a human three-
year-old.  Kanzi, however, is categorized as a legal thing, while this anencephalic 
girl who is not even conscious is a legal person. 
Id.
 110. In arguing for the practical advantages of an intelligence approach, Wise 
concedes it would not be his first choice if he were not taking practical considerations 
into account: “If I were Chief Justice of the Universe, I might make the simpler capacity 
to suffer, rather than practical autonomy, sufficient for personhood and dignity-rights.”  
WISE, supra note 89, at 34. 
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any creature that is intelligent enough to demonstrate practical autonomy 
deserves to be assigned rights.111  According to Wise: 
[A] being has practical autonomy and is entitled to personhood and basic liberty 
rights if she: 1. can desire; 2. can intentionally try to fulfill her desires; and 3. 
possesses a sense of self sufficiency to allow her to understand, even dimly, that 
it is she who wants something and it is she who is trying to get it.112
Wise pays particular attention to chimpanzees and bonobos as animals 
he believes often meet his standard of practical autonomy, but he 
explores the possibility of practical autonomy for other types of animals 
as well, including orangutans, gorillas, honeybees, African Grey parrots, 
dogs, dolphins, and elephants.113
Supporters of rights for intelligent animals do not argue that they should 
receive all rights that competent adult humans enjoy.  For example, most 
rights activists would not assert that animals should be permitted the 
right to vote, on the same basis that children and incapable adults are not 
permitted the right to vote.114  Rather, activists typically assert that 
intelligent animals should be permitted basic dignity rights, such as 
freedom from having their bodies used or experimented upon without 
consent—rights of “bodily integrity and bodily liberty.”115
Comparisons to rights for nonhuman entities, infants, and mentally 
incapable adults are especially significant to activists who argue that 
rights should at least be assigned to particularly intelligent animals.  
Such comparisons strikingly raise the question of why intelligent animals 
should not be granted some level of rights when less intellectually 
capable humans and entities with no natural life at all are given some 
rights.  As one writer asserted, “[t]he elevation of certain animals to 
personhood status for particular purposes is supported by the granting of 
similar status to other nonhumans.”116
Philosophers predating enhanced understanding of animals’ minds 
often argued that animals are different from humans in that animals do 
111. Id. at 32. 
112. Id.
113. See id. at 49–230. 
114. See WISE, supra note 77, at 243–48 (conceding that animals’ rights should be 
limited because—although they may have practical autonomy—they do not have full 
autonomy); Sunstein, supra note 7, at 11 (noting that arguments for animal rights “of 
course” do not mean that animals “can vote or run for office;” instead “[t]heir status 
would be akin to that of children—a status commensurate with their capacities”); see also 
Adam J. Fumarola, With Best Friends Like Us Who Needs Enemies? The Phenomenon of 
the Puppy Mill, the Failure of Legal Regimes to Manage It, and the Positive Prospects of 
Animal Rights, 6 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 253, 283–89 (1999) (arguing that animals should be 
assigned rights, but that their rights should be limited). 
 115. WISE, supra note 77, at 7, 267. 
 116. Huss, supra note 35, at 71.
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not have the ability to truly think or feel.117  Aristotle, for example, compared 
animals to “automatic puppets.”118  Augustine opined that animals have 
no emotions.119  In the seventeenth century, Rene Descartes asserted that 
animals are mere automatons or robots and that they are not able to feel 
pain, pleasure, or other emotions.120  Scientific study, however, has revealed 
animals to have many attributes and abilities not previously understood.  
Broad publicity about chimpanzees’ strong genetic similarity to humans, 
although frequently overstated and misunderstood, has changed the way 
 117. See, for example, 1 AURELIUS AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 31–32 (Marcus 
Dods trans., T & T Clark 1871) (412): 
Putting aside, then, these ravings, if, when we say, Thou shalt not kill, we do 
not understand this of the plants, since they have no sensation, nor of the 
irrational animals that fly, swim, walk, or creep, since they are dissociated 
from us by their want of reason, and are therefore by the just appointment of 
the Creator subjected to us to kill or keep alive for our own uses; if so, then it 
remains that we understand that commandment simply of man.  The commandment 
is, “Thou shalt not kill man;” therefore neither another nor yourself, for he who 
kills himself still kills nothing else than man. 
Id.  A second example is S. J. HOLMES, STUDIES IN ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 16–17 (1916) 
(“Among . . . animals there is no intelligence, no spiritual soul as we are commonly told.  
They eat without pleasure, cry without pain.  They grow without knowing it; they desire 
nothing; they know nothing . . . .” (quoting Nicolas Malebranche)).  Finally, John Locke 
explains:
If it may be doubted whether beasts compound and enlarge their ideas that way 
to any degree; this, I think, I may be positive in,—that the power of abstracting is 
not at all in them; and that the having of general ideas is that which puts a 
perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the 
faculties of brutes do by no means attain to. 
1 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 207–08 (Alexander 
Campbell Fraser ed., Clarendon Press 1894) (1690). 
 118. 1 ARISTOTLE, Movement of Animals, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
1087, 1092 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984). 
 119. GERARD O’DALY, AUGUSTINE’S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 47, 89 (1987). 
 120. See 3 RENÉ DESCARTES, To Reneri for Pollot, April or May 1638, in THE
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES 96, 100 (John Cottingham et al. trans., 1991) 
(1596–1650):
Now suppose that this man were to see the animals we have, and noticed in 
their actions the same two things which make them differ from us . . . .  There 
is no doubt that he would not come to the conclusion that there was any real 
feeling or emotion in them, but would think they were automatons, which, 
being made by nature, were incomparably more accomplished than any of 
those he had previously made himself. 
Id.  See also Gary L. Francione, The Use of Nonhuman Animals in Biomedical Research: 
Necessity and Justification, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 241, 244 (2007). 
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many humans think about chimpanzees.121  We now know that chimpanzees 
have complex social relationships and hierarchies.122  They use tools,123
they are capable of learning a form of sign language,124 they grieve 
deaths of companions,125 and some of them are capable of recognizing 
themselves in a mirror.126  Although such comparisons may be quite 
misleading, some have ventured to assert that chimpanzees have intellectual 
ability roughly comparable to a two- or three-year-old human child.127
One legal activist asserts that if chimpanzees and bonobos were given 
basic dignity rights, humans could only do to them “what you could 
[legally] do to a three-year-old child.”128
Of course, chimpanzees and other great apes are not alone among 
animals found to have stronger intellectual abilities than were previously 
understood.  Many news accounts have documented the exceptional 
intelligence of dolphins.129
Increasing understanding of some animals’ intellectual, communicative, 
and emotive abilities provides a surface appeal to arguments that they 
121. See generally JONATHAN MARKS, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE 98% CHIMPANZEE:
APES, PEOPLE, AND THEIR GENES 32–33, 40–45, 261–62 (2002) (detailing the genetic 
similarities between chimpanzees and humans). 
 122. Nicholas E. Newton-Fisher, Hierarchy and Social Status in Budongo 
Chimpanzees, 45 PRIMATES 81, 85–86 (2004).
 123. JANE GOODALL, THROUGH A WINDOW: MY THIRTY YEARS WITH THE 
CHIMPANZEES OF GOMBE 18–19, 59 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1990). 
124. See Jane H. Hill, Apes and Language, in SPEAKING OF APES: A CRITICAL 
ANTHOLOGY OF TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION WITH MAN 331, 331–51 (Thomas A. Sebeok 
& Jean Umiker-Sebeok eds., 1980); see also Roger S. Fouts & Deborah H. Fouts, 
Chimpanzee Sign Language Research, in THE NONHUMAN PRIMATES 252, 252–56 
(Phyllis Dolhinow & Agustín Fuentes eds., 1999). 
125. See WISE, supra note 77, at 212–13 (relating a story regarding how 
chimpanzees in the Los Angeles Zoo attempted to rescue a young chimp that had 
accidentally strangled himself with a nylon rope, and how they grieved following his 
death). 
 126. Gordon G. Gallup, Jr., Chimpanzees: Self-Recognition, 167 SCI. 86, 86–87 
(1970).
127. See Dominique Lestel, How Chimpanzees Have Domesticated Humans: 
Towards an Anthropology of Human-Animal Communication, ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY,
June 1998, at 12, 13 (discussing a study of a pygmy chimpanzee that “shows a 
performance of language comprehension which is similar to that of a two year old 
child”). 
128. See Lisa Capone, Wise Counsel for Animals—Steven Wise, Animal Rights 
Activist, BNET BUS. NETWORK, Mar. 2000, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi 
_m0FRO/is_2_133/ai_60129620. 
129. See, e.g., Ken Marten & Suchi Psarakos, Using Self-View Television to 
Distinguish Between Self-Examination and Social Behavior in the Bottlenose Dolphin 
(Tursiops Truncatus), 4 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 205, 205–24 (1995); Associated 
Press, Dolphin Whistles Offer Signs of Language Ability, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2000, at 
F2; Anuschka de Rohan, Deep Thinkers: The More We Study Dolphins, the Brighter 
They Turn Out to Be, GUARDIAN (London), July 3, 2003, at 8, available at http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/science/2003/jul/03/research.science. 
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should be assigned basic dignity rights, as are infants and mentally incapable 
adults who may have less ability in all three areas.  Highlighting that even 
corporations and ships—which have no inherent intellectual, communicative, 
or emotive abilities—are granted rights adds to the surface appeal of 
arguments for rights for intelligent animals.130  However, thoughtful 
analysis of each of these categories of rights bearers demonstrates the 
inadequacy of such arguments.  The rights provided for each of these 
categories of entities and persons all share a common theme in their 
ultimate focus on humanity and human interests.131  Assigning rights to 
animals would represent a dramatic and harmful departure from the 
established focus of rights and responsibilities on humans. 
 130. Francione, supra note 21, at 435; Marguerite Hogan, Standing for Nonhuman 
Animals: Developing a Guardianship Model from the Dissents in Sierra Club v. Morton, 
95 CAL. L. REV. 513, 522 (2007) (footnote omitted).  Hogan notes: 
Yet nonhuman animals are qualitatively different from other nonhuman entities that 
have standing to sue on the basis of their own injury, such as corporations and 
ships.  Unlike these entities, nonhuman animals have the ability to engage in 
various mental processes, such as reason and desire, and they also suffer 
emotionally and physically as a direct result of pain and trauma.  Thus 
nonhuman animals possess the very characteristics—the ability to suffer and 
rational thought—that merit the protections that their human counterparts 
enjoy. . . .  Yet inanimate objects often possess more rights than they do. 
Id.  Cass R. Sunstein explains: 
Congress is frequently permitted to create juridical persons and to allow them 
to bring suit in their own right.  Corporations are the most obvious example.  
But plaintiffs need not be expressly labeled ‘persons,’ juridical or otherwise, 
and legal rights are also given to trusts, municipalities, partnerships, and even 
ships. . . .  In the same way, Congress might say that animals at risk of injury 
or mistreatment have a right to bring suit in their own names. 
Cass R. Sunstein, Can Animals Sue?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 251, 260–61.  
Finally, see Laurence H. Tribe, Ten Lesson Our Constitutional Experience Can Teach 
Us About the Puzzle of Animal Rights: The Work of Steven M. Wise, 7 ANIMAL L. 1, 2–3 
(2001), explaining that: 
[T]he truth is that even our existing legal system . . . has long recognized rights 
in entities other than individual human beings.  Churches, partnerships, corporations, 
unions, families, municipalities, even states are rights-holders; indeed, we 
sometimes classify them as legal persons for a wide range of purposes. . . .  
With the aid of statutes like those creating corporate persons, our legal system 
could surely recognize the personhood of chimpanzees, bonobos . . . .  Just as 
the Constitution itself recognizes the full equality of what it calls natural born 
citizens with naturalized citizens, who acquire that status by virtue of 
Congressional enactment, so the possible dependence of the legal personhood 
of non-human animals on the enactment of suitable statutory measures need 
not be cause to denigrate the moral significance and gravity of that sort of 
personhood.
Id.
131. See infra notes 132–201 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Rights for Corporations 
“The legal meaning of persons has ‘changed over time,’”132 as the rise 
of corporate personhood illustrates.  In 1819, Chief Justice John Marshall 
acknowledged corporate personhood.  However, he emphasized its symbolic 
and “artificial” nature.  He summarized that “[a] corporation is an artificial 
being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.  
Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which 
the charter of its creation confers upon it . . . .”133  Chief Justice Marshall’s 
characterization “has become one of the classic definitions of the corporation 
as a ‘creature’”134—a “mere” creature, no less.135  This is quite different 
from an animal as a creature because humans create corporations solely 
to serve human interests.  As such, corporations are not natural entities; 
they exist as legal fictions because treating them as persons for some 
purposes makes them more useful to humans. 
The United States Constitution does not mention corporations, but in 
the 1800s, lawyers argued that they should be considered “citizens” or 
“persons” meriting constitutional protection.136  Late in that century, the 
Supreme Court began finding corporations to be “persons” for some purposes 
under the Constitution, and in the 1900s, the Court began applying some 
but not all of the Bill of Rights’ protections to corporations.137  Presently, 
corporations enjoy Fifth Amendment due process protections, along with 
“first amendment guarantees of political speech, commercial speech, and 
negative free speech rights; fourth amendment safeguards against 
unreasonable regulatory searches; fifth amendment double jeopardy and 
132. See Huss, supra note 35, at 71. 
 133. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). 
 134. Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal 
Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV 563, 565 n.10 (1987). 
135. Woodward, 17 U.S. at 636. 
136. See Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of 
Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 579 (1990) (“To claim legal status, nineteenth century 
lawyers argued that corporations should be considered ‘citizens’ or ‘persons’ for 
application of various constitutional provisions.”).
137. See id. at 582–83 (noting that as “the political and regulatory environment” of 
the twentieth century changed, “[e]ach development encouraged the corporation to assert 
Bill of Rights privileges and to abandon the previous, increasingly ineffective, strategy 
of relying on fourteenth amendment protections”); see also Elizabeth Salisbury Warren, 
The Case for Applying the Eighth Amendment to Corporations, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1313, 
1317 (1996) (“The Court has followed a trend of extending rights to corporations, but it 
has not agreed to a wholesale application of the bill of rights protections to corporate 
entities.  Instead of granting blanket protection, the Court has approached amendments 
separately and has used different reasoning in applying them to corporations.”). 
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liberty rights; and sixth and seventh amendment entitlements to trial by 
jury.”138
As noted above, several animal rights activists have argued that if 
nonhuman and even nonsentient corporations are assigned liberty rights, 
animals—or at least particularly intelligent animals—should be assigned 
rights too.139  However, under all theories of corporate personhood, 
corporations are—at their core—legal pretensions that provide proxies 
for human interests.  Animals are not fictitious surrogates for humans—
they are real and distinct beings.  Over the years, various theories seeking to 
explain corporate personhood have been developed.  Reviewing these 
theories demonstrates that all of them share an ultimate focus on the 
interests of humans. 
1.   The Artificial Entity—Concession and Fiction—                                   
Theory of Corporations 
Justice Marshall’s 1819 description of a corporation as an “artificial” 
being that is a “mere creature” of law provides140 the essence of what has 
come to be known as the “artificial entity” theory of corporations.141  At 
times this is also referred to as the “concession and fiction” theory, 
which is sometimes addressed separately but which fits together with the 
artificial entity doctrine “to form a coherent whole.”142  The artificial 
entity theory provides “the standard legal definition of a corporation, an 
artificial legal person created by state law.”143  The “concession” aspect 
of the theory is that the corporation “derives its being [solely] by 
concession from the State.”144  Under this theory, corporations are purely 
 138. Mayer, supra note 136, at 582. 
139. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
140. Woodward, 17 U.S. at 636. 
141. See Mayer, supra note 136, at 580 (noting that the “artificial entity” is “[t]he 
first and most traditional notion[,] . . . viewing the corporation as nothing more than an 
artificial creature of the state, subject to government imposed limitations and restrictions”). 
142. See Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the 
Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (1994). 
143. Id.
144. Id.; see also Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholders 
and Corporate Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L.
393, 397 (1993) (“Concession theorists argue that corporations exist at the sufferance of 
the government, which retains a legitimate role in conditioning its grant of a corporate 
charter (viewed as the concession of the government) on the receipt of some quid pro 
quo.”); Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public Personality of 
the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201, 201–02 (2006) (“According to the view 
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artificial creatures that exist only at the state’s whim.  The artificial entity 
theory dominated the first part of the 1800s.145
In the early 1800s, corporations were individually created by specific 
legislative grants from states.146  Although hardly a novelty,147 at that 
time, corporations were a much rarer vehicle for conducting business than 
they are today.148  Eventually, as corporations grew in number and importance, 
states began adopting general incorporation statutes, which may have 
encouraged courts to wander from the artificial entity theory.149
Although the artificial entity theory has been joined by other theories of 
corporate personhood, it still pervades formal corporate doctrine150 and 
remains prevalent in corporate theory.151
The predominance of the artificial entity theory in the development of 
corporate law doctrine—and its continuing importance at present—does 
much to answer the argument that animals should have rights because 
corporations have rights.  As artificial entities, corporations are fictitious 
proxies for the combined interests of their human stakeholders.152
that a corporation has its legal origin in a concession by the state, the corporation is a 
creature of the government and is thus properly subject to regulation.”).
145. See Phillips, supra note 142, at 1065. 
146. Id.; see also John C. Coates IV, Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate 
Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806, 817 (1989) (“Originally . 
. . the Jacksonians were opposed to the very existence of corporations . . . [but] [o]nce in 
power, . . . they began a ‘free incorporation movement’ designed to extend the 
availability of the corporation to all white males.  As a result of this movement, states 
developed general incorporation statutes.” (footnotes omitted)); Susan Pace Hamill, The 
Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1459, 1494–95 (1998) 
(“Prominent Jacksonians, wanting to cure the evils of special privileges conferred by the 
special corporate charters, advocated the creation of general incorporation laws that 
would allow equal access to the corporate form to all those meeting the statutory 
requirements.”).
147. See Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach 
to a Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 67 (2005) 
(“The corporate entity was not a novel concept in America at the time of the nation’s 
founding, for corporate law was transplanted from England, where theories of the 
corporate entity were already being developed.” (footnote omitted)). 
148. Id. at 61 (“Over the last two hundred years, the American business corporation 
has developed from a seldom-used method of doing business into the predominant 
economic actor in society.”). 
149. See Phillips, supra note 142, at 1065 (noting that “[t]he rise of general 
incorporation statutes also meant that private initiative played an increasingly important 
role in the formation and behavior of corporations”). 
150. See id. at 1065–66. 
151. See Krannich, supra note 147, at 71 (“The artificial entity metaphor remained 
the dominant view of the corporate entity through much of the nineteenth century, and it 
remains prevalent in corporate theory as well as constitutional law today.”). 
 152. “Stakeholders” may be a more apt description than the narrower designation of 
“shareholders,” because corporate theory may consider the interests of humans 
connected with a corporation beyond the shareholders, such as officers and directors.  
See infra notes 173–76 and accompanying text.
CUPP.UPDATEPRINTER 3/12/2009 10:11:24 AM
[VOL. 46:  27, 2009] Moving Beyond Animal Rights 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
 55
Similarly, they are assigned rights as a proxy for their human shareholders.  
Corporate rights are thus, in essence, an extension of the rights of humans.  
Absent the interests of their human stakeholders, corporate rights would 
be meaningless. 
2.  The Aggregate Entity Theory of Corporate Personhood 
The aggregate entity theory of corporate personhood was also invoked 
beginning in the 1800s, and it reached prominence in the latter half of 
the century.153  The aggregate entity metaphor portrays a corporation as 
“an association of individuals contracting with each other in organizing 
the corporation.”154  This theory draws analogies to partnerships, where 
humans sought to benefit by joining together and aggregating their 
efforts.155  At first the aggregate theory focused almost exclusively on 
shareholders as a corporation’s elements.156  However, later formulations 
“tended to include various other people who make up the corporation,” 
such as officers and directors.157  Some formulations have been even 
broader in considering entities in relationship with the corporation.158
Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous observations regarding Americans’ 
propensity toward joining together in associations may provide insight 
regarding the aggregation theory’s roots.  As noted above, corporations 
in early America were not a dominant economic force.159  However, as 
de Tocqueville put it, “the right and ability of individuals to form voluntary 
associations constituted an integral part of the fabric of American society;” 
these associations included “commercial and manufacturing companies.”160
The aggregate theory centers on facilitating such partnerships between 
humans through the use of corporations. 
153. See Phillips, supra note 142, at 1065. 
 154. Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations,
15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 293 (1990); see also Krannich, supra note 147, at 72. 
155. See Phillips, supra note 142, at 1065 (“[D]uring the latter part of the nineteenth 
century some theorists began to use partnership analogies to describe the corporation, 
thereby characterizing it as an aggregate formed by private contracting among its human 
parts.”). 
156. See id. at 1066. 
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text. 
 160. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 128–29, 140–41 (Henry 
Reeve trans., Cambridge: Sever and Francis 1862) (1840), quoted in Krannich, supra 
note 147, at 72.
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Indeed, as with the artificial entity theory—but perhaps in an even 
more direct manner—the aggregate theory focuses on corporations as 
creations serving the interests of humans.  Justifications for the theory 
tend to directly address its benefits to individual citizens working together 
with other citizens.  The aggregation metaphor was most influential in 
the years following Andrew Jackson’s presidency, when corporations 
became broadly welcomed as a vehicle for empowering individual humans.  
As Jess Krannich explained in 2005, “[r]ecognizing the capability of the 
corporate entity as a market participant (especially as the country 
became increasingly industrial), Jacksonian era corporate theorists began 
advocating the availability of the corporate entity to every citizen as a 
means of conducting business.”161  He added that “[t]he great innovation 
of Jacksonian era corporate theorists was to make the general business 
corporation available to all Americans.”162  In language even more squarely 
placing the aggregate theory’s emphasis on serving the goals of individual 
humans, Krannich further asserted: 
Due to the general incorporation statutes, the corporate entity came to be seen 
“as merely one form of voluntary association, an aggregation of talent and 
resources, consciously entered into by individuals.”  This made it difficult to ignore 
the individuals behind the corporate fiction.  This concept of the corporate 
entity as a vessel for individual self-realization, coupled with the corporate bar’s 
strong push for enhanced corporate rights, led to the adoption of the aggregate 
entity metaphor in corporate and constitutional jurisprudence.163
Michael J. Phillips presented the aggregate theory as a form of 
methodological individualism, which a mid-twentieth century proponent 
eloquently described as asserting that: 
[T]he ultimate constituents of the social world are individual people . . . .  Every 
complex social situation, institution, or event is the result of a particular 
configuration of individuals . . . .  [W]e shall not have arrived at rock-bottom 
explanations of such large-scale phenomena until we have deduced an account 
of them from statements about the dispositions, beliefs, resources, and inter-
relations of individuals.164
As demonstrated in these quotations, the humanness of the aggregate 
theory is manifest.  Unlike animal rights, which would be directed at animals 
as entities completely separate from human creation or identity, the aggregate 
theory reveals corporations as vehicles for human interests. 
 161. Krannich, supra note 147, at 75. 
162. Id.
163. Id. at 75–76 (quoting Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s
Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 254 (1998)).
 164. J. W. N. Watkins, Methodological Individualism and Social Tendencies, in
READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 269, 270–71 (May Brodbeck ed., 
1968).
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3.  The Natural—Real—Entity Theory of Corporations 
The natural entity theory of corporations, sometimes called the real 
entity theory, was in vogue toward the end of the 1800s and at the 
beginning of the 1900s.165  Its rise corresponded with the growth of 
larger corporations, which for a time made the metaphor of a corporation 
as an aggregation of partners less intuitively appealing than it had been 
in earlier years.166  During this period it became apparent—at least in 
large corporations—that officers and directors rather than shareholders 
made most of the decisions.167  This encouraged theorists to increasingly 
emphasize the separateness between corporations and the immediate 
actions and influence of their shareholders.  Thus, the natural or real entity 
theory focused on the independence of corporate personhood under the 
legal fiction that corporations were considered “real” or “natural” entities 
capable of independent action and deserving of independent rights. 
The natural entity theory “is associated with continental theorists who, 
at the turn of the century, wrote about ‘group’ or ‘corporate’ personality in 
an effort to challenge individualism and to come to terms with institutions 
of modern society such as corporations, trade unions, universities, 
and professional associations.”168  As this foundation reveals, the natural 
entity theory was consistent with the artificial entity theory and the 
aggregate theory in its focus on humanity and human interests, but the 
natural entity theory centered on the needs and interests of human institutions 
and groups rather than on narrow individualism.  The artificial entity 
theory and the natural entity theory competed for judicial approval in the 
1800s, with courts sometimes favoring one and sometimes the other.  
165. See Mayer, supra note 136, at 581 (“By the early twentieth century, the natural 
entity theory was established firmly, if not permanently.”); see also Charles D. Watts, 
Jr., Corporate Legal Theory Under the First Amendment: Bellotti and Austin, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 317, 326–27 (1991) (“[T]he natural entity theory developed in the 1890s . 
. . [and] still appears in modern literature [although] it seems to have lost its dominance, 
at least in the academic community.”). 
166. See Phillips, supra note 142, at 1067; see also Dalia Tsuk, Corporations
Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 
1872 (2003) (“In part, the success of the natural entity theory of the corporation was due 
to the inability of the contractual paradigm to accommodate the dramatic changes in 
business structure at the turn of the twentieth century.”). 
167. See Phillips, supra note 142, at 1067 (“[During] the 1880s it was beginning to 
become clear that management, not shareholders, were the real decision-makers in large 
publicly owned enterprises.” (quoting Martin Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The 
Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 206 (1985))).
 168. Mayer, supra note 136, at 580–81. 
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One scholar has noted that courts’ choices between the theories seemed 
to hinge on whether the courts accepted rights and personhood for 
corporations or rejected them: “The ‘artificial entity’ theory was invoked 
to deny corporations constitutional protection; the ‘natural entity’ theory 
was used to accord them safeguards.”169
Perhaps the most significant case favoring the natural entity theory 
was Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad170 in 1886.  In that 
case, the Supreme Court for the first time granted constitutional rights to 
a corporation, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause prohibited a California county from taxing a railroad’s property 
differently from how it taxed human citizens’ property.171  Other 
constitutional protections developed over time, but the natural entity 
theory’s emphasis on the corporation as a distinct and independent entity 
is perceived as facilitating this initial foray into constitutional rights for 
corporations.172
169. Id. at 581. 
 170. 118 U.S. 394, 409–10 (1886).
171. Id. at 417, aff’g 18 F. 385, 401–02 (C.C. Cal. 1883) (“That the proceeding by 
which the taxes . . . were levied against the railroad companies . . . was not due process 
of law, seems to me so obviously true as to require no further illustration. . . .  In neither 
view . . . was the assessment valid, and the taxation levied upon it cannot be sustained.”).  
The lower court explained: 
[T]he members [of a corporation] do not, because of such association, lose their 
rights to protection, and equality of protection.  They continue, notwithstanding, to 
possess the same right to life and liberty as before, and also to their property, 
except as they may have stipulated otherwise.  As members of the association—of 
the artificial body, the intangible thing, called by a name given by themselves—
their interests, it is true, are undivided, . . . but it is property, nevertheless, and 
the courts will protect it, as they will any other property, from injury or 
spoliation. 
18 F. at 402–03.  The Supreme Court, while affirming the holding of the lower court, did 
not specifically address the due process issue in its opinion.  However, at the beginning 
of the arguments, then-Chief Justice Waite explained there was no need to discuss 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment applied to corporations because the whole Court 
thought it did.  See 118 U.S. at 396 (“The court does not wish to hear argument on the 
question whether the [equal protection] provision in the Fourteenth Amendment . . . 
applies to these corporations.  We are all of opinion that it does.”).  Despite the dearth of 
analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment in its actual opinion, by affirming the lower court 
decision, the Supreme Court established that corporations were persons within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g., Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. 
Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897) (“It is well settled that corporations are persons within 
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.” 
(citing a list of Supreme Court cases beginning with Santa Clara County)).
172. See Mayer, supra note 136, at 581.  In addition, see Tsuk, supra note 166: 
As early as 1886, in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. . . . 
the Supreme Court declared that corporations were protected by the safeguards 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process clauses. . . .  
Supreme Court decisions consistently reinforced the natural entity paradigm by 
upholding “the personhood of corporations with respect to property rights,” 
especially in cases relating to the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. 
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Although apologists for the natural entity theory differ as to a corporation’s 
nature, many seem to downplay analogies to an organic being.173  Some 
argue that a corporation is best viewed “as a system: a network whose 
human and nonhuman components form a relatively coherent and stable 
whole due to their mutual interrelationships.”174  This view of the natural 
entity idea of a corporation as a system seeks to recognize that a 
corporation is a thing separate from individuals, but that it is nonetheless 
the product of humans created to further humans’ interests.  Under this 
natural entity perspective, a corporation is “a collection of people united 
into a coherent whole by the mutual social relations that shape them.”175
Because “‘[i]n every case the members are in greater or lesser degree 
modified by the association into which they enter,’ this system’s attributes 
cannot be described as the sum of those members’ attributes as they 
existed before joining.”176  The pioneering British sociologist Leonard T. 
Hobhouse used the social structure of a family to illustrate.177  A family 
is a separate entity made up of humans and it furthers the interests of 
humans, but it is more than the sum of its individual members.  Hobhouse 
noted that “[e]very association of men is legitimately regarded as an 
entity possessing certain characteristics of its own, characteristics which 
do not belong to the individuals apart from their membership of that 
association.”178
The natural entity theory’s heyday was relatively short, and it had 
fallen out of favor with courts by the 1920s.179  The theory’s fall from 
grace has been portrayed as a backlash against overly abstract theoretical 
constructs, with a shift instead toward a more concrete analysis of 
Id. at 1871–72. 
173. See Phillips, supra note 142, at 1069 (noting that although some natural entity 
theorists described corporations as organisms, “[m]any exponents . . . have decidedly 
less organicist conceptions of the corporation”).
174. Id.; see also PATRICIA H. WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND CORPORATIONS 
56–57 (1985); Michael J. Phillips, Corporate Moral Personhood and Three Conceptions 
of the Corporation, 2 BUS. ETHICS Q. 435, 450–51 (1992). 
 175. Phillips, supra note 142, at 1114. 
176. Id. at 1114–15 (quoting L.T. HOBHOUSE, THE METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF THE 
STATE: A CRITICISM 28–29 (5th prtg. 1951)). 
177. See HOBHOUSE, supra note 176, at 28 (noting that the human family is an 
expression of “lives so far as lived in common or in close association with one another” 
and “as it stands at any given moment is simply the co-ordinated or associated whole of 
its members as they stand at the same moment”). 
178. Id. at 27, quoted in Phillips, supra note 142, at 1113–14. 
179. See Phillips, supra note 142, at 1062.
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competing rules and their consequences.180  In other words, the natural 
or real entity theory was not “real” enough—its metaphysical qualities 
became viewed as too fanciful and not sufficiently tied to the pragmatic 
consequences of courts’ rules regarding corporations. 
Legal theorists led the attack on corporate theory, maintaining that 
undue “conceptualism” and abstract legal reasoning in general were 
muddying rather than solving problems.181  An influential law review 
article published by John Dewey in 1926 exemplified this critique with 
his assertion that each group personality theory “has been used to serve 
the same ends, and each has been used to serve opposing ends.”182
However, even if the natural entity theory were accepted as a model for 
explaining the status of corporations, it accords with the artificial entity 
theory and the aggregate theory in possessing its ultimate grounding in 
humanity and in human relationships.  Although under the natural entity 
theory, the corporation is described as “natural” or “real” rather than 
180. See John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 
YALE L.J. 655, 658–60 (1926).  Dewey asserted that the natural entity theory requires 
inspection and investigation of the internal inherent properties of the entity to determine 
if it qualifies as a legal “subject” and whether or not the entity possesses the required 
properties to be held as a right-and-duty-bearing unit.  Id.  The result, he concluded, is 
convoluted assertions about necessary preconditions and the great effort required in 
holding down the seemingly unattainable definition of “subject” that incorporates both a 
singular man and a conglomerated body or corporation.  Id.  Dewey pointed out the 
failings of the natural entity theory and presented a theory that focuses on consequence 
as a superior replacement.  His theory, based on Charles S. Peirce’s pragmatist rule, 
focuses on: 
[N]ot the inner nature of objects but their mutual relations, . . . [thus] the right-
and-duty-bearing unit, or subject, signifies whatever has consequences of a 
specified kind. . . .  The consequences must be social in character, and they 
must be such social consequences as are controlled and modified by being the 
bearing of rights and obligations, privileges and immunities.  Molecules and 
trees certainly have social consequences; but these consequences are what they 
are irrespective of having rights and duties.  Molecules and trees would 
continue to behave exactly as they do whether or not rights and duties were 
ascribed to them; their consequences would be what they are anyway.  But 
there are some things, bodies singular and corporate, which clearly act differently, 
or have different consequences, depending upon whether or not they possess 
rights and duties, and according to what specific rights they possess and what 
obligations are placed upon them.  If the logical principle be granted, it is a 
factual matter what bodies have the specifiable consequences and what these 
consequences are; but it becomes a verbal matter whether we call them all 
“persons”, or whether we call some of them persons and not others—or 
whether we abandon the use of the word entirely. 
Id. at 661–62; see also Phillips, supra note 142, at 1070 (asserting that for approximately 
fifty years following the 1920s an “antitheoretical attitude dominated corporate scholarship in 
the United States”). 
181. See Mayer, supra note 136, at 639 (“The powerful, corrosive critiques of the 
Legal Realists expedited the demise of corporate theory.”). 
182. See Dewey, supra note 180, at 669.
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artificial, it is treated as the creation of humans—or at least of human 
society—and its focus is on facilitating human endeavors. 
Just as describing families as real or natural entities rather than as 
artificial constructs does not diminish the intense humanness of families, 
theorizing about corporations as possessing a distinctive status does not 
diminish the humanity of society and of social structures and systems.  
Animals, in contrast, are not products of human society and are not 
centered on humanness.  As moral agents, humans bear responsibility for 
treating animals humanely.183  However, unlike corporations, asserted 
rights for animals must stand on their own, as animals are neither 
humans nor human instruments. 
4.  The Nexus-of-Contracts Theory 
The most recently introduced approach to conceptualizing corporations is 
called the “nexus-of-contracts” theory.  The nexus-of-contracts theory 
generally views a corporation “as a connected group or series of contracts 
among the firm’s participants.”184  To serve effectively as a nexus of 
contracts, generally a corporation must have clear decisionmaking authority 
through its board of directors, and it must provide credible assurance that 
it will perform its contractual obligations.185  This theory began to gain 
popularity among corporations scholars in the 1980s, “chang[ing] . . . 
dramatically” the antipathy toward theoretical approaches that had 
characterized the previous fifty years.186
Significantly, the nexus-of-contracts theory has been viewed as a 
resurrection of the aggregate theory—the idea that corporations are “an 
association of individuals contracting with each other in organizing the 
corporation.”187  Michael J. Phillips notes that “the nexus-of-contracts 
theory also is an aggregate theory of the firm.  Like the aggregate theory, 
the nexus-of-contracts theory refuses to recognize a meaningful corporate 
entity distinct from the components that form the corporation.”188
Further, the theory “asserts that a corporation is a set of contracts and . . . 
183. See infra notes 292–93 and accompanying text. 
 184. Phillips, supra note 142, at 1071. 
185. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational 
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 392 (2000).
 186. Phillips, supra note 142, at 1071. 
 187. Blumberg, supra note 154, at 293; see also Krannich, supra note 147, at 72. 
 188. Phillips, supra note 142, at 1071. 
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those contracts must have parties . . . .”189  Therefore, the theory “obviously 
is a very individualistic one” focused on each human and business 
entity—each of which is formed by individual humans—contracting 
together through the corporation.190  Various proponents of the nexus-of-
contracts theory seem to place differing emphasis on various categories 
of contracting parties—shareholders, managers, employees, creditors, 
and others—but they tend to view these parties as individuals driven by 
self-interest, with a particular emphasis on financial self-interest.191  Robert 
Hessen, an early exponent of the theory, explains that “[t]he term corporation 
actually means a group of individuals who engage in a particular type of 
contractual relationship with each other.”192
Thus, as with the other theories underlying the personhood of corporations, 
the currently popular nexus-of-contracts theory focuses ultimately on the 
interests of humans.  It does so even more directly than does the natural 
entity theory, which the legal realists unraveled in the early twentieth 
century.193 These analyses of corporate personhood’s theoretical 
underpinnings establish that corporate personhood does not in fact support 
creating animal personhood.  Arguing that corporate law sets a precedent 
for extending personhood to other nonhumans, such as animals, ignores 
why courts created and maintain corporate personhood.  Corporations 
are legal persons solely because treating them as such benefits humans.194
Rather than establishing an argument in favor of animal rights, corporate 
personhood and rights instead provide an illustration of how animal 
rights are different from the rights that courts presently recognize.  
Divorcing rights from humanity would not be an evolutionary step 
comparable to extending rights to slaves, women, or human creations 
such as corporations.  It would be instead a misguided repudiation of 
law’s innate humanness, with all of the blessings and curses inherent in 
humanity. 
B.  Rights for Ships Under Admiralty Law 
In addition to personhood for corporations, United States admiralty 
courts’ recognition of a form of personhood in ships may at first glance 
seem to favor assigning rights to animals.  The argument overlaps strongly 
189. Id. at 1062. 
190. Id. at 1071–72. 
191. Id. at 1073.  Professor Phillips notes that from this theoretical perspective, 
human units tend not to be examined as “flesh-and-blood people, but [as] the rational 
utility maximizers of economic theory.”  Id. 
 192. ROBERT HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION 42 (1979).
193. See supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text. 
194. See supra text accompanying note 152. 
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with analogies drawn to corporations—if rights are recognized for an 
inanimate thing, should not, even more so, basic rights for an intelligent 
animate being such as a chimpanzee be recognized?195
Under the admiralty “doctrine of personification,” ships may be 
treated as a defendant in an in rem civil lawsuit in the United States.196
The doctrine appears to have its roots in English admiralty courts in the 
1500s.197  The English courts dropped the doctrine in the 1900s, but it 
has lived on, uniquely, in American courts.198
As with corporate personhood, limited personhood for ships has a human 
purpose.  The doctrine “aids prospective plaintiffs, as it may be difficult 
to determine the ownership of the ship and the actual responsible 
parties.”199  Thus, if a plaintiff cannot determine who owns a ship, the 
plaintiff may still recover by suing the ship as a “person.”  Granting 
personhood to ships provides what is perceived to be a concrete benefit 
to humans,200 and if it did not, personhood would doubtless not be 
granted.  Thus, as is the case with corporate personhood, limited legal 
personhood for ships does not in fact provide support for animal 
rights.201
195. See Huss, supra note 35, at 71 (stating that granting personhood status to 
nonhuman subjects such as “corporations, ships and other entities” supports the “elevation of 
certain animals to personhood status for particular purposes”).  As noted above, some 
animal rights activists focus on rights for particularly intelligent animals such as 
chimpanzees, but others cast their net even more broadly, seeking rights for all animals 
capable of suffering.  See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
196. See Huss, supra note 35, at 74; see also Martin Davies, In Defense of 
Unpopular Virtues: Personification and Ratification, 75 TUL. L. REV. 337, 338 (2000) 
(noting the increased criticism from legal academia and judges of the “doctrine of 
personification of ships[,] . . . which regards a ship as having rights and obligations 
separate from those of its owner,” and noting that “[c]riticism has tended to focus on 
cases in which the ship itself is held liable but its owner is not”). 
197. See Davies, supra note 196, at 341–43 (noting that the doctrine of 
personification “can be traced back to the practice of English admiralty courts in the 
sixteenth century,” and was created, according to the opponents of the doctrine, “as a 
means to defend and extend the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty . . . [by 
making the ship] the defendant simply for the purpose of keeping the proceedings out of 
the reach of the [English] common law’s writ of prohibition”). 
198. Id.
 199. Huss, supra note 35, at 74. 
 200. Not all commentators agree that the doctrine of admiralty personhood provides 
benefits that make it worth retaining, and the United States is apparently unique in 
upholding the doctrine.  See Davies, supra note 196, at 339–40; Huss, supra note 35, at 
74.
 201. Other nonhuman entities that have been assigned limited personhood include 
universities, agencies, and local governmental entities.  See Huss, supra note 35, at 74.  
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IV. CONTRACTUALIST PERSONHOOD: THE CENTRALITY OF              
HUMANITY TO RIGHTS
No general agreement exists on how rights should be precisely defined.202
Rights entail complex moral, policy, societal, and cultural considerations,203
and both philosophers and legal analysts have offered numerous conflicting 
and competing models seeking to explain or categorize rights. 204  As 
addressed above, use of rights language in legal discourse has blossomed 
since World War II.  Many legal thinkers seem smitten with the “romance 
of rights” in the afterglow of the civil rights movement’s important 
victories.205  This romance influences how rights are perceived and enhances 
the role of emotion in arguments for and against expansion of rights.  
However, despite differences about what rights are, scholars often agree 
that personhood is at their core.206  The United States Constitution addresses 
“persons” and “citizens” as those subject to its protections.207  Thus, no 
matter how it is defined, personhood is a central gateway issue in 
deciding whether to extend fundamental rights to animals. 
The rights status of human embryos provides a helpful illustration of 
personhood’s centrality—and potential malleability—in assignments of 
rights.  In Davis v. Davis,208 the Tennessee Supreme Court confronted 
this issue when divorcing spouses fought over custody of the couple’s 
frozen embryos.  The wife wished to use the embryos for implantation in 
her own body or for donation to another couple.209  The husband wished 
to have the embryos destroyed.210  Citing a report by the American 
Fertility Society, the Davis court recognized that three major positions 
exist regarding the personhood status of embryos.211  Some ethicists 
As with corporations and ships, limited rights for these entities are clearly focused on 
serving humans’ interests.  Id.
202. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
203. See Thomas G. Kelch, The Role of the Rational and the Emotive in a Theory of 
Animal Rights, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (1999). 
204. See Huss, supra note 35, at 78 (noting that the concept of rights is “a loaded 
term,” one that “can be considered in many ways”). 
205. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
206. See Jens David Ohlin, Is the Concept of the Person Necessary for Human 
Rights?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 212 (2005) (“[M]ost scholars assume that, whatever it 
means, personhood is indispensable for making a human rights claim.”). 
207. See Fraternal Order of Police Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc. v. Manger, 
929 A.2d 958, 975 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (highlighting that the Fourth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution “protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by 
the government and provides in part that ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated . . . .’” (quoting Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992))).
 208. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1992). 
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See Ohlin, supra note 206, at 210. 
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view embryos as full human persons as soon as they have been 
fertilized.212  Others view embryos as mere human tissue, and thus as a 
type of property.213  The third position balances the other two, holding 
that an embryo is not an actual person but that it “deserves respect 
greater than that accorded to human tissue” due to “its potential to become a 
person” and “its symbolic meaning for many people.”214
Davis endorsed the third position—that embryos are not persons with 
rights—but that they deserve special treatment because of their potential 
to become persons.215  The difficult issues raised by Davis about the 
ethical status of an embryo press the far reaches of personhood.  However, 
the gulf between this issue on the edge of personhood and efforts to 
assign personhood to animals is enormous.  As with personhood for 
corporations and ships, questions of personhood for embryos relate 
directly to humans and to humanity.  Even under the narrowest possible 
view of their status, embryos at the very least have the capacity to 
become human.  Animals will never become human and lack even the 
“symbolic meaning” of potential humanity. 
Although embryos may be viewed as holding a status at the edges of 
personhood, courts have accepted personhood status and at least some 
fundamental rights for postbirth children, even infant children not yet 
capable of autonomy.216  Again this illustrates the centrality of humanity and 
human interests in analyses of personhood.  Regardless of potential theoretical 
constructs on what constitutes a person, infants are incontrovertibly 
human.  Assignment of rights to mentally incapable adults also makes 
sense when humanity is recognized as the focus of courts’ assignment of 
personhood.217 Mentally incapable adults’ lack of autonomy does not 
make them nonhuman in the eyes of society or of society’s courts, and 
thus they are assigned personhood and fundamental rights. 
212. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596. 
213. Id.
214. Id. at 596, quoted by Ohlin, supra note 206, at 210. 
215. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
216. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Comm. of Concerned Teachers v. Greenburgh #11 Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 25, 30 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the fundamental right of 
representation is protected by the court and in the event that an infant’s authorized 
representative is not suitable, “a court may appoint a ‘next friend’ to ensure that the 
infant’s rights are protected in a court of law”); Bachman v. Mejias, 136 N.E.2d 866, 869 
(N.Y. 1956) (holding that the court’s domestic duty of protecting citizens extends to all, 
and “[t]he individual rights of infants to invoke the protection of the State in which they 
reside cannot be ignored”). 
217. See infra notes 268–79 and accompanying text. 
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Although philosophers and legal scholars have formulated several 
theories on the nature of rights, social contract principles—which philosophers 
often refer to as “contractualism”218—are particularly useful in considering 
how courts consider rights in the trenches of litigation.  Social contract 
theory also helps explain why humanity and human interests are central 
to courts’ decisions regarding when to assign rights.  Although several 
variants of social contract theory have been articulated, general 
reciprocity between rights and responsibilities is a basic tenet.219  Under 
this view, society generally extends rights in exchange for express or 
implied agreement from its members to submit to social responsibilities.220
Animals cannot submit to societal responsibilities.  They lack moral 
agency and of course cannot be held accountable for their actions.  
When an animal bites a human or another animal without provocation, 
we do not have the offending animal arrested and put on trial.  We view 
courts having done so in the Middle Ages with a sense of absurdity or 
dark humor, perhaps with the feel of a Monty Python sketch.221 New
Scientist derided assigning rights to animals on this basis: 
If animals have rights which protect them against humans, it is only logical that 
they should have rights that protect them from each other.  If a chimp kills 
another chimp in the wild, or a human, do we really want to hire a fleet of 
lawyers?  And if we extended honorary personhood to all animals, would the 
gazelle be entitled to rights against the lion?222
 218. Contractualism may be summed up as: “I seek to pursue my interests in a way 
that I can justify to others who have their own interests to pursue.”  This requires “equal 
moral status of persons . . . [and the] capacity for rational autonomous agency.”  Elizabeth 
Ashford & Tim Mulgan, Contractualism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractualism/.
219. See Francione, supra note 120, at 247 (describing reciprocity attributes of 
contractualism); Huss, supra note 35, at 61 (“Reciprocity is at the core of contractualism . . . .”). 
 220. The doctrine may also be described with a focus on responsibilities: Under 
social contract theory, members of society also surrender some of their liberties in order 
to enjoy “the order and safety of the organized state.”  Social Contract, in THE COLUMBIA 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 2640 (Paul Lagassé ed., 6th ed. 2000), available at http://www.bartleby. 
com/65/so/socialco.html.
221. See, e.g., E. P. EVANS, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
OF ANIMALS 16 (1906) (noting the fourteenth century case where an “infanticidal sow 
was executed in the old Norman city of Falaise”); Piers Beirnes, The Law Is an Ass: 
Reading E.P. Evans’ The Medieval Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals, 2 
SOC’Y & ANIMALS 27, 28 (1994), available at http://www.psyeta.org/sa/sa2.1/beirne.html.  
Beirnes explains: 
From the later Middle Ages until the eighteenth century, certain peoples in 
Europe held the anthropomorphic notion that animals could commit crime.  
Indeed, those animals that were officially suspected of so doing were 
prosecuted for their misdeeds in secular courts and, if convicted, were subject 
to a variety of punishments, including public execution. 
Id.
 222. Editorial, The Great Divide?, NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 13, 1999, at 3, available at
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg16121730.100 -the-great-divide.html.
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Because animals cannot be morally blameworthy, they also cannot be 
in and of themselves morally deserving of rights.  However, this does not 
mean that humans are free to be cruel or negligent toward animals.223
Rather, the imperative for humans to be humane toward animals derives 
from humans’ moral agency.  Unlike its treatment of animals, society 
treats humans as responsible for their conduct, including their conduct 
toward animals. 
Immanuel Kant was one of the early contractualists to write about the 
rights status of animals.224  As a contractualist he did not favor assigning 
formal rights to animals, arguing that moral duties can only be owed to 
rational beings that can participate in the social contract.225  However, 
Kant emphasized the importance to humanity of treating animals humanely.  
Although humans must take care to treat animals well, Kant found this 
obligation to be derived from human responsibilities.226  He believed that 
humans “have indirect duties to animals, duties that are not toward them, 
but in regard to them insofar as our treatment of them can affect our 
duties to persons.”227  He wrote: 
If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer capable of service, he 
does not fail in his duty to the dog, for the dog cannot judge, but his act is 
inhuman and damages in himself that humanity which it is his duty to show 
towards mankind.  If he is not to stifle his human feelings, he must practise 
kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in 
his dealings with men.228
223. Cf. Huss, supra note 35, at 61.  Professor Huss asserts that under John Rawls’s 
view of contractualism, “[a]s animals are not able to participate in the formation of this 
social contract (because they presumably do not possess a sense of justice and are not 
rational), there is no moral obligation not to harm them.”  Id. My view is that humans do 
have moral obligations calling for humane treatment of animals but that this is based on 
human obligations of moral agency rather than on rights ascribed to amoral animals.  See
infra notes 309–10 and accompanying text. 
224. See Huss, supra note 35, at 60–61 (“Immanuel Kant’s ideas can be viewed as 
providing the historical basis for the modern contractualist’s views on the treatment of 
animals.”). 
225. Id. at 61; see also KANT, supra note 1, at 239 (“[S]o far as animals are 
concerned, we [humans] have no direct duties.  Animals are not self-conscious and are 
there merely as a means to an end.  That end is man.”).
226. See Huss, supra note 35, at 61; Martha C. Nussbaum, Beyond “Compassion 
and Humanity”: Justice for Nonhuman Animals, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 
299, 300. 
 227. Lori Gruen, The Moral Status of Animals, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2007), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ 
moral-animal/. 
 228. KANT, supra note 1, at 240.
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The philosopher John Rawls was the most prominent champion of 
contractualism in recent times.229  He argued that the moral community 
includes only those who “are capable of having (and are assumed to 
acquire) a sense of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and to act 
upon the principles of justice, at least to a certain minimum degree.”230
Animals, he concluded, are not members of the moral community 
because they lack the “capacity for a sense of justice.”231  However, like 
Kant, Rawls’s view that animals are not part of the moral community did 
not lead him to a disregard for their welfare.  He insisted that “it does not 
follow that there are no requirements at all in regard to [animals] . . . .  
Certainly it is wrong to be cruel to animals and the destruction of a 
whole species can be a great evil.”232
Evolutionary anthropologist Jonathan Marks elaborates on the importance 
of focusing on humans in seeking humane treatment, asserting that: 
A concern for animal welfare must come out of a concern for human welfare.  It 
must emerge from a concern for human rights, not supplant it.  For once we 
begin to devalue human lives, we lose a standard by which to value any other 
kind of lives.  And it just doesn’t work the other way around.233
Marks emphasizes the importance of protecting animals such as 
nonhuman primates.234  However, he cautions that humans must guard 
against allowing concern for animals to come at the expense of concern 
for human welfare.235
In the early twentieth century, jurisprudence scholar Wesley Hohfeld 
formulated what has become “[p]erhaps the most popular way of 
speaking about legal rights.”236  He described legal relations in terms of 
opposites and correlatives and “believed that the term ‘right’ should be 
restricted in use to describe those things that correlate to duties. . . .  
Rights are simple and atomic; rights are claims based on duties.”237
Courts have utilized the framework formulated by Hohfeld in analyzing 
legal terms.238  This formulation recognizes the significance of the social 
contract in assigning rights: Rights generally have relevance in relation 
229. See Huss, supra note 35, at 61 (describing Rawls as “a more contemporary and 
influential proponent of contractualism” than Kant). 
 230. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 505 (1971), quoted in Francione, supra
note 120, at 246. 
 231. RAWLS, supra note 230, at 512, discussed in Francione, supra note 120, at 246. 
 232. RAWLS, supra note 230, at 512. 
 233. MARKS, supra note 121, at 195. 
234. Id.
235. Id.
 236. Kelch, supra note 203, at 6. 
237. Id. at 7.
238. See California v. Farmers Mkts., Inc., 792 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir. 1986); 
Kelch, supra note 203, at 6 n.32. 
CUPP.UPDATEPRINTER 3/12/2009 10:11:24 AM
[VOL. 46:  27, 2009] Moving Beyond Animal Rights 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
 69
to duties or responsibilities.  Philosopher L.W. Sumner recognized the 
relevance of Hohfeld’s framework in animal rights issues, concluding 
that under the frequently cited approach, animals cannot have rights 
because they do not have duties or responsibilities.239
Hohfeld’s formulation of rights might be the most popular because it 
fits most closely with Western societies’ intuitions and education about 
rights.  Thomas Jefferson borrowed from contractualist John Locke in 
drafting the Declaration of Independence.240  Locke’s conception of the 
social contract is that citizens are entitled to “life, liberty and property.”241
Jefferson merely substituted “pursuit of happiness” for “property” in this 
theme at the core of our national identity.242
School children in the United States are taught social contract theory 
as a basis for the ideals of the American Revolution.  For example, one 
state articulates a teaching objective for eighth grade social studies 
students as being to “[a]nalyze the origin of the ideas behind the 
Revolutionary movement and the movement toward independence; [for 
example], social contract, natural rights, English traditions.”243
As another of many potential examples, a textbook published by the 
United States government for use by immigrants who wished to be 
candidates for citizenship explained that in the book, “[a]n effort is made 
to use concepts that the immigrant can relate to, such as the social 
contract and delegation of authority by the people as supported by the 
Constitution, to help the student understand and appreciate representative 
government.”244  Social contract ideals of rights mirroring responsibilities 
were an important intellectual underpinning in the formation of the 
United States, and our education system appropriately teaches contractualist 
 239. See L.W. SUMNER, THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF RIGHTS 203 (1987); Kelch, 
supra note 203, at 8 (“L.W. Sumner, using a Hohfeldian framework, has also concluded 
that animals cannot have rights since those who are rightholders must be able to comply 
with normative rules, which excludes animals.”). 
240. See Susan Salter Reynolds, Against Happiness: In Praise of Melancholy, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2008, at R9 (book review). 
241. See id.
242. See id.
 243. Utah State Office of Education, Textbook Alignment to the Utah Core—8th 
Grade Social Studies—U.S. History, Objective 5.1(b), http://www.schools.utah.gov/curr/IMC/ 
AlignedMaterials/SS/0131336568_hst1.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2009).
 244. JOHN G. HERVEY, FEDERAL TEXTBOOK ON CITIZENSHIP. OUR CONSTITUTION 
AND GOVERNMENT: LESSONS ON THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES FOR USE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS BY CANDIDATES FOR CITIZENSHIP (1973),
http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/3a/fd/9
6.pdf.
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themes from the Revolutionary period such as “no taxation without 
representation” as a foundation of our national identity.  The average 
American likely does not know the philosophical term contractualism,
but that same average American has been taught social contract ideals as 
the very basis of democracy.  We are taught from a young age that just 
as government must give us representation to go along with taxation, it 
must give us rights that correlate with our societal responsibilities. 
Richard Posner has downplayed the practical significance of academic 
philosophical concepts on the question of animal rights,245 and although 
law is connected to abstract philosophy at least at a theoretical level, he 
has a point.  Posner calls Peter Singer—a champion of utilitarianism—
one of his “stalking horses” on the issue of rights.246  Under utilitarianism, 
behavior that creates the most utility should be encouraged.247  Posner 
applies this theoretical philosophy to a hypothetical involving an 
aggressive dog and a human infant.  He asks us to consider a situation in 
which a dog is about to attack an infant, and we can only stop the dog by 
inflicting severe pain on it.248  If the pain we need to inflict on the dog to 
stop it from harming the infant exceeded the infant’s potential pain from 
the attack, Posner argues that a utilitarian approach treating animals’ 
pain as equally important to humans’ pain would require allowing the 
infant to be attacked.249  He then notes that “any normal person (and not 
merely the infant’s parents), including a philosopher when he is not self-
consciously engaged in philosophizing, would say that it would be 
monstrous to spare the dog, even though to do so would minimize the 
sum of pain in the world.”250  Further: 
 245. Professor Brian Leiter employs humor to defend Posner’s legal pragmatism 
from critics such as Professor Ronald Dworkin: 
Ronald Dworkin describes an approach to how courts should decide cases that 
he associates with Judge Richard Posner . . . as “a Chicago School of anti-
theoretical, no-nonsense jurisprudence.”  Since Professor Dworkin takes his 
own view of adjudication to be diametrically opposed to that of the Chicago 
School, it might seem fair, then, to describe Dworkin’s own theory as an 
instance of “pro-theoretical, nonsense jurisprudence.” 
Brian Leiter, In Praise of Realism (and Against ‘Nonsense’ Jurisprudence) 1 (Mar. 26, 
2008), (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1113461. 
 246. Posner, supra note 88, at 51.
247. See LAWRENCE M. HINMAN, ETHICS: A PLURISTIC APPROACH TO MORAL 
THEORY 163–64 (2d ed. 1998) (“Utilitarianism demands that we consider the impact of 
the consequences on everyone affected by the action under consideration. . . .  Typically, 
utilitarians claim that we ought to do whatever produces the greatest amount of utility.”). 
248. See Posner, supra note 88, at 64. 
249. Id.
250. Id.
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If the moral irrelevance of humanity is what philosophy teaches, so that we have 
to choose between philosophy and the intuition that says that membership in the 
human species is morally relevant, philosophy will have to go . . . .  Just as 
philosophers who have embraced skepticism about the existence of the external 
world, or hold that science is just a “narrative” with no defensible claim to yield 
objective truth, do not put their money where their mouth is by refusing to jump 
out of the way of a truck bearing down on them, so philosophers who embrace 
weird ethical theories do not act on those theories even when they could do so 
without being punished.  There are exceptions, but we call them insane.251
Similarly, most humans imbued with social contract principles from 
their earliest education about the nature of rights are unlikely to change 
their views based on abstract philosophical arguments.  Steven Wise 
acknowledges the difficulty of changing strongly held societal views 
about the status of animals and argues that change may take place slowly 
over time—“funeral by funeral”—as people gradually become more 
enlightened—from his perspective—regarding animals in successive 
generations.252  However, the significance of social contract principles in 
the intellectual foundation of the American Revolution is a widely 
accepted historical fact, and that will not change over time.  Its role as 
the “principal justification” for American independence is “especially 
familiar.”253 John Locke’s writings “were a primary authority for the 
251. Id. at 65.  Singer addresses Posner’s critique of philosophy by noting, among 
other things, that pragmatism is in itself a philosophical position.  See Peter Singer, 
Ethics Beyond Species and Beyond Instincts: A Response to Richard Posner, in ANIMAL 
RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 78, 80.  Singer responds to Posner’s assertion that philosophers 
have not been prominent in relatively recent changes in moral norms regarding race, 
homosexuality, nonmarital sex, contraception, and suicide by arguing: 
Note how the initial claim that “ethical arguments” did not bring about these 
changes is suddenly turned into the entirely separate claim that “philosophers” 
were not prominent in these movements, and then at the end, this becomes a 
claim about “academic philosopher[s].”  But that is not what was to be shown.  
Can anyone read the judgments of Thurgood Marshall or Earl Warren, or the 
speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr., and not believe that they were putting 
forward ethical arguments? 
Id. at 85.  However, a challenge to academic philosophers’ practical influence does not 
minimize the importance of ethical arguments to agents of great change such as Martin 
Luther King, Jr.  Although Dr. King was clearly motivated, as are all of us, by views that 
could be described as philosophy, his level of practical influence would probably have 
been much different had he presented his position only in an abstract philosophical 
framework published by an academic press. 
252. See WISE, supra note 77, at 72 (quoting economist Paul Samuelson). 
 253. Thad W. Tate, The Social Contract in America, 1774–1787: Revolutionary 
Theory as a Conservative Instrument, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 375, 375 (1965). 
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Colonists, and his social contract furnished the political theory for both 
the American Revolution and the framing of the Constitution.”254
Thus, when philosophers or political theorists argue that other rights 
models are superior, they are swimming against a formidable tide in 
seeking widespread practical application of their views.  At least in 
the United States, so long as children are taught and continue to believe 
that the ideals that led to the American Revolution are to be cherished, 
they will likely retain a powerful attraction to social contract principles 
as a basis for rights throughout their lives.  Whether the perception that 
rights are correlative to responsibilities is an inherent moral instinct or 
learned or some combination of instinct and learning, a key point is that 
the perception is widely held.  Abstract theory counts in law’s evolution, 
but it does not count nearly as much as the facts on the ground.  As 
constitutional scholar Geoffrey Stone noted, judges typically build legal 
theory around results they feel are desirable, and not the other way 
around.255
A.  The “Argument from Marginal Cases”: Addressing Rights                 
for Infants and  Mentally Incapable Adults                                                
Under Contractualism 
As discussed above, some animal rights activists emphasize that rights 
are assigned to artificial entities, such as corporations and ships, in arguing 
by analogy that intelligent animals should have rights.256  However, 
analogizing rights assigned to human infants and to mentally incapable 
adults is even more popular among animal rights proponents; one writer 
calls it their “central argument.”257  This analogizing between infants or 
mentally incapable adults and intelligent animals in rights debates is 
sometimes termed “the argument from marginal cases.”258  Gary Francione 
describes the problem as a challenge to those who would rely on 
contractualism to deny rights to animals: 
 254. Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 859 (1999).
 255. Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons 
from the Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 101, 104 (2008). 
256. See supra notes 132–201 and accompanying text. 
 257. Elizabeth Anderson, Animal Rights and the Values of Nonhuman Life, in
ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 277, 279. 
258. See DANIEL A. DOMBROWSKI, BABIES AND BEASTS: THE ARGUMENT FROM MARGINAL 
CASES 1 (1997); see also Anderson, supra note 257, at 279–80. 
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[T]here are many human beings who are not able to exercise or respond to 
moral claims.  Assuming that moral rights and duties are properly viewed as 
arising from a hypothetical social contract—very significant assumption—there 
are plenty of humans who lack the capacity to participate in such contractual 
arrangements . . . [b]ut these characteristics are wholly irrelevant to whether a 
human should be treated as the resource of others.259
The argument is that because infants and mentally incapable adults are 
not treated as property and are assigned limited rights despite lacking 
moral agency, it is unfair to treat animals as property on the basis of 
their lacking moral agency.  The argument from marginal cases is at its 
strongest when the comparison is to particularly intelligent animals, such 
as chimpanzees and bonobos.  Such animals may have significantly 
more intelligence and communicative ability than infants and many 
mentally incapable adults, and thus one might argue they are actually 
closer to moral agency than are some humans. 
Although the argument from marginal cases may be attractive on its 
surface, it is unpersuasive.  Although arguments by analogy are important 
and often appealing, they are also malleable and can be misleading—as 
demonstrated in the efforts described above to argue by analogy that if 
nonliving corporations are assigned rights, then a fortiori living and 
intelligent animals should be assigned rights.260  Analogizing between 
limited rights for infants and mentally incapable adults and potential 
limited rights for animals is both problematic and dangerous. 
First, the argument from marginal cases fails to account for the 
complexity of human lives and relationships.261  When deciding how 
they should treat a human infant, people do not engage in an assessment 
of its “practical autonomy” to determine whether it is deserving of moral 
rights and, one hopes, they never will.262  Humans’ motivation to protect 
human children may be, in part, instinctive.263  To the extent that 
 259. Francione, supra note 120, at 246.
260. See supra notes 132–201 and accompanying text. 
261. See Anderson, supra note 257, at 280 (“[T]he AMC [Argument from Marginal 
Cases] fails to appreciate the rich complexity of both animal and human lives, and the 
ways this figures in rights claims.”). 
 262. For an assessment of arguments that a being’s practical autonomy should 
determine whether it is assigned rights, see supra notes 111–13. 
263. See, e.g., Morten L. Kringelbach et al., A Specific and Rapid Neural Signature 
for Parental Instinct, PLOS ONE, Feb. 27, 2008, http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/ 
journal.pone.0001664 (showing that humans are emotionally attracted to babies and that 
the region in the brain that controls emotion is highly specifically active “within a seventh of 
a second in response to unfamiliar infant faces but not to adult faces”). 
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explanations for such instincts are even necessary, some are not difficult 
to articulate at a basic level.  In addition to sensing infants’ vulnerability 
and need for protection, humans see hope in them.  They are not yet 
moral agents able to participate in the social contract, but they represent 
the future of humanity and of the social contract.  How they develop will 
determine what society will become.  If they are denied moral rights and 
treated badly, society will suffer. 
This sentiment is demonstrated in how courts generally address family 
law cases and mandatory education cases.  In family law disputes over 
child custody, for example, courts focus on the best interests of the child 
rather than the interests of the mother or the father.264  This is because 
the child’s development is important to society’s welfare.265  Depending 
on how he or she is raised, the child might develop a cure for cancer 
someday or—at the other extreme—might become a mass murderer.266
Society has a vested interest in the child’s future.  The same may be said 
of mandatory education.  Society recognizes an important interest in having 
educated adult participants in the social contract, and thus it forcefully 
asserts itself in requiring that children be educated.267  This essential 
connection between human children and society’s future powerfully 
distinguishes children from intelligent animals that will never become 
members of the social contract. 
One may not make this argument in the same way regarding many 
mentally incapable adults because many of them will remain mentally 
incapable their entire lives and will never attain moral agency.  Unlike 
infants, many such adults cannot easily be seen as representing the social 
contract’s future.  However, they do represent its echo.  In the practical 
world—as contrasted with abstract philosophical hypotheses—humans 
264. See, e.g., Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt, 146 N.W.2d 57, 58 (S.D. 1966) (holding that 
concerning child custody, “[t]he welfare of the children is of paramount consideration 
and superior to the legal rights and claims of either parent”). 
265. See, e.g., Eloise Pasachoff, Block Grants, Early Childhood Education, and the 
Reauthorization of Head Start: From Positional Conflict to Interest-Based Agreement,
111 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 371 (2006) (highlighting society’s interest in early childhood 
development, “leading to the growth of an entire industry to support young children’s 
early development . . . [with] [c]hild care and development . . . seen as a broad-based 
societal need and a common reality”); Elizabeth A. Varney, Note, Trading Custody for 
Care: Why Parents Are Forced to Choose Between the Two and Why the Government 
Must Support the Keeping Families Together Act, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 755, 759–60 
(2004) ( “[P]roper rearing is essential to the child’s development as a valuable member 
of society”). 
266. See Cupp, supra note 9, at 19 (“An infant, while perhaps not possessing 
consciousness at one stage of its life, may grow up to become the next Einstein or 
Gandhi or may develop a cure for cancer.”). 
267. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Scott, 520 F.2d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 1975) (“The state has a 
right to compel school attendance.”); see also Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189, 1192–93 
(10th Cir. 1974) (holding Oklahoma’s compulsory education law as constitutional). 
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recognize a sameness in mentally incapable adults that they will never 
feel even with intelligent animals.268  Most people perceive mentally 
incapable adults as human first, and mental incompetence is seen as an 
aspect of their humanity rather than as a negation of it.  Humans “who 
are unable, because of some disability, to perform the full moral functions 
natural to human beings are certainly not for that reason ejected from the 
moral community.”269  Gary Francione rejects such reasoning, asserting 
that “[t]his argument . . . begs the question since the problem is how to 
distinguish humans from other animals by some characteristic that may 
be shared by some animals but that is not possessed by all humans.”270
However, humans and their courts do not evaluate intelligence in deciding 
whether to assign human dignity rights; they evaluate humanness.271  All 
of us know we could become a mentally incapable adult; none of us might 
become a chimpanzee, and we cannot possibly relate to a chimpanzee 
on the same level that we can relate to another human. 
Further, and thankfully, courts do not have a mechanism for formally 
determining which mentally incapable adults have absolutely no hope of 
future participation in the social contract.  Many mentally incapable adults, 
such as those in a temporary coma, will some day regain their mental 
competence and their moral agency.  Additionally, we do not know the 
future of medicine.  Some mental conditions that may presently appear 
permanent might be cured during our lifetimes.272  Although the hope of 
future moral agency for mentally incapable adults is different from the 
more certain hope of future moral agency for children, it is still hope.  
Animals, in contrast, will always be animals. 
268. See Cupp, supra note 9, at 19 (“Courts assign dignity rights to [a mentally 
incapable person] because she is a human, and most other humans feel a bond of 
sameness with her stronger than any bond of sameness they might feel with the most 
intelligent of animals.”). 
 269. Carl Cohen, The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research, 315 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 865, 866 (1986), quoted in Francione, supra note 120, at 247. 
 270. Francione, supra note 120, at 247.
 271. As Richard Posner notes, “[i]f the moral irrelevance of humanity is what 
philosophy teaches, so that we have to choose between philosophy and the intuition that 
says that membership in the human species is morally relevant, philosophy will have to 
go.”  Posner, supra note 88, at 65. 
 272. For particularly striking illustrations of adults who suffered long-term paralysis 
with only occasional ability to move or communicate and then experienced dramatic—if 
temporary—improvement through drug treatment, see OLIVER SACKS, AWAKENINGS 60–
71 (Vintage Books 1999) (1973). 
CUPP.UPDATEPRINTER 3/12/2009 10:11:24 AM
76
It is also important to note that the line between no moral agency and 
some moral agency in humans is fuzzy.  No clear boundaries exist 
between people who are minimally intelligent but morally responsible to 
some degree and people who are nearly but not quite intelligent enough 
to be morally responsible to any degree.273  Thus, seeking to divide 
humans on the basis of intelligence for purposes of determining whether 
dignity rights should be assigned would be unworkable.  In contrast, 
courts’ current approach of assigning human dignity rights to all humans 
because they are human—regardless of their intellectual competence—
avoids the confusion and tragic misjudgments that would be inherent in 
a case-by-case approach.274
Finally, as addressed further in Part V, assigning rights to intelligent 
animals based on comparisons to mentally incapable adults threatens the 
weakest and most vulnerable members of human society.275  Even the 
phrase sometimes used to frame the debate—“arguments from marginal 
cases”276—highlights a challenge to human dignity.  No human is marginal.  
As John Marks notes, “Singling out particular classes of people in order 
to show how similar they are to apes is a troubling scientific strategy, 
not least of all when the humans rhetorically invoked are the very ones 
whose rights are most conspicuously in jeopardy.”277  Marks derides 
blurring the line between humans and apes as “an unscientific rhetorical 
device” that is “morally problematic (in addition to being zoologically 
ridiculous).”278  Concluding that some animals may be able to “earn” 
dignity rights if it is established that they are sufficiently intelligent 
implies that perhaps some humans should lose their dignity rights if they 
273. See PETER CARRUTHERS, THE ANIMALS ISSUE: MORAL THEORY IN PRACTICE
114 (1992).
 274. Gary Francione challenges concerns about line-drawing.  He argues that 
“[a]lthough there are certainly going to be cases where it is difficult to draw the line, it is 
also the case that we can distinguish between rational humans and those who are 
unequivocally non-rational.”  Francione, supra note 120, at 247.  He adds that “[i]f we 
had a rule that defined a non-rational human as having an IQ less than twenty and 
administered that rule fairly, then it would seem that Carruthers would be committed to 
saying that it would be acceptable to deny moral status to such humans.”  Id.  I cannot 
speak for Professor Carruthers, but denying moral status to humans with IQs below 
twenty would be deeply offensive to my sensibilities and, I suspect, to the sensibilities of 
most humans.  As demonstrated in the analysis provided in this Part, the difficulty in 
drawing a sharp line between humans with moral agency and humans without moral 
agency is only one of numerous factors to consider in deciding whether all humans 
should be assigned dignity rights regardless of their intelligence, and intelligence is not 
nearly as important as a mentally incapable person’s status as a human being. 
275. See infra text accompanying notes 299–302. 
276. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.  Daniel Dombrowski notes that the 
phrase’s name was suggested by Jan Narveson, one of its detractors, and that some find 
the label objectionable.  See DOMBROWSKI, supra note 258, at 1. 
 277. MARKS, supra note 121, at 191. 
278. Id. at 192.
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are sufficiently unintelligent.  “If [humanity] can be earned, of course, it 
can also be lost; they are two sides of the same coin.”279  If mere cognitive 
performance were the standard, it is difficult to see why a bright adult 
chimpanzee would not have more rights than a human infant or a 
mentally incapable adult.  This would seem to be edgy territory even for 
an academic philosophical theory; it should be given no opportunity for 
practical application in the real world of courts and law. 
V. COSTS OF RIGHTS EXPANSION
All assignments of new rights have costs.  As a contractualist perspective 
on rights recognizes, generally new rights assigned to an individual 
create new responsibilities for society and for other members of society.  
Even without formal reference to contractualist principles, the use of 
“opposites and correlatives” typically used to explain rights concepts 
recognizes that costs generally go along with the benefits of rights.280
Limiting defamation law to protect free speech, for example, has the cost 
of restricting compensation for some persons who have been seriously 
harmed by defamatory speech but cannot recover due to speech-protective 
limitations.281  In many cases in which new rights have been assigned, 
the benefits of expanding or recognizing rights have far outweighed the costs.  
Almost all would agree that this is the case with slavery.  Recognizing a 
“new” right against slavery was quite worth the cost of depriving 
slave owners of what had been previously recognized as their property.  
However, more is not necessarily better in all situations.  The societal 
burdens that come with rights must be considered in addition to their 
benefits.
When activists casually use rights concepts to address animals’ welfare, 
they risk ignoring or minimizing societal costs.  Among the most dangerous 
costs of assigning dignity rights to animals is the relaxation of human 
dignity protections that would likely accompany the change.  It is not 
alarmist to note that inventing new rights for animals would make us 
view humans as less special and unique.  Rather than only seeing animals’ 
279. Id. at 190–91. 
280. See supra text accompanying note 237. 
281. See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282–84 (1964) 
(holding that the Constitution limits damages for libel in actions brought by public officials 
against critics).
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rights status rise, we should expect also to see humans’ rights status fall, 
with human rights and animal rights meeting somewhere in the middle. 
As noted above, if dignity rights were to be based on the notion of 
“practical autonomy”—as advocated by some leading animal rights 
theorists—it is difficult to imagine why an intelligent chimpanzee would 
not be entitled to greater rights protection than a human infant or a 
mentally incapable adult.282  After all, the chimp has greater practical 
autonomy than these humans.283  Indeed, one might wonder whether a 
human infant or an adult with severe mental disabilities would be entitled to 
dignity rights at all.  A comatose human being does not have limited practical 
autonomy; he or she has virtually no practical autonomy.284  Thus, 
such a person may not keep pace with some animals in the competition for 
rights.  Under this approach, if the dignity rights of a chimpanzee conflicted 
with potential dignity rights for the comatose human, presumably the 
chimp’s interests would prevail. 
Steven Wise seeks to use the example of human infants and mentally 
incapable adults to further his position that attainment of practical 
autonomy should be a basis for assigning dignity rights to animals.  He 
asserts that unless we are willing to assign rights to beings without full 
autonomy, we must come to “a ‘monstrous conclusion’: a great many 
human beings don’t make the cut.”285  Wise addresses the partial autonomy 
problem by arguing that exhibiting “preferences and the ability to act to 
satisfy them”286 demonstrates enough practical autonomy to justify assigning 
some kinds of rights.  He believes that many chimpanzees and other 
intelligent animals possess this level of autonomy.287  However, although 
this proposed rights expansion solution seeks to raise the status of many 
chimpanzees, its potential implications for humans who have little or no 
practical autonomy are frightening.  Wise argues that legal rights for 
infants “might be explained as resulting from legal fictions or sheer 
arbitrariness” or that they might relate to infants’ potential for human 
autonomy, as addressed above.288  However, he rejects assigning some 
rights on the basis of potential for future autonomy, asserting that “the 
potential for autonomy no more justifies treating one as if one had 
autonomy any more, and probably less, than does one’s potential for 
282. See supra text accompanying notes 259–60. 
283. Id.
284. Id.
 285. WISE, supra note 89, at 30–31, quoting Carl Wellman, REAL RIGHTS 113–14 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1995)). 
286. See WISE, supra note 89, at 32.  For a more detailed discussion of Wise’s 
practical autonomy test, see supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text. 
287. See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text. 
 288. WISE, supra note 89, at 32; see supra notes 256–67 and accompanying text. 
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dying justify that one should be treated as if one were dead.”289  If 
practical autonomy is to be an important rights standard, and the potential 
for future practical autonomy is not seen as enough, one must wonder 
how secure human infants would be in their rights.  Need we be concerned 
about rights implications for human infants, who at least have a strong 
probability of attaining practical autonomy eventually?  How much more 
must we worry for human adults with serious mental disabilities that will 
likely be permanent? 
Wise apparently seeks to rescue infants and severely mentally incapable 
adults by asserting that they may be assigned some level of limited 
rights despite their disability.290  However, he insists that “[p]ersonhood 
and basic liberty rights should be given in proportion to the degree one 
has practical autonomy.”291  This seems to further the concern that some 
humans could be found to have less personhood than some animals.  To 
note an extreme, even something as repulsive as state-sponsored 
euthanasia for humans with severe mental retardation would be more 
foreseeable at some point in the future if a lack of practical autonomy for 
humans made it permissible to rank some animals’ rights more highly than 
some humans’ rights. 
A related but more subtle cost of assigning rights to animals relates to 
the societal impact of lessening the connection between rights and 
responsibilities in a manner fundamentally different from all previous 
extensions of rights.  Applying the rhetoric of rights to animals implicitly 
lessens the significance of moral behavior because animals are not 
capable of moral behavior.292  Rights theorists want animals to be seen 
as more like humans, but the inevitable companion of that result would 
be to see humans as more like animals.  The consequences of courts changing 
the rhetoric of rights to detach it from humans, human concerns, and 
moral agency would likely not be felt overnight, but over time the 
change would almost certainly influence our thinking.  Words and concepts 
matter,293 and a world with less emphasis on human dignity and moral 
responsibility would not be better for it. 
 289. WISE, supra note 89, at 32–33.
290. Id. at 44. 
291. Id.
 292. As noted above, this concern should not apply in the same way to extensions 
of rights to infants, mentally incapable adults, or even corporations.  See supra notes
256–67 and accompanying text. 
293. See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict 
Products Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 
CUPP.UPDATEPRINTER 3/12/2009 10:11:24 AM
80
One might argue that concern over erosion of status for those already 
holding rights could also have been used in an earlier era as an excuse to 
argue against extension of rights to slaves,294 but that is quite different.  
Slaves were moral agents and were equally capable of participation in 
the social contract as were nonslaves.  There was never a legitimate basis 
for enslaving humans; enslaved humans were always equal to free humans, 
but their equality was simply not recognized.295  As species incapable of 
moral responsibility, animals are not equal to humans as capable bearers 
of rights. 
Although lowering the status of human rights may be the most prominent 
concern with applying a rights paradigm to animals, erosion of economic 
rights could create the most immediate and widespread societal disruption, 
particularly if rights were assigned on the “capacity to suffer” approach 
that many animal rights theorists favor.296  If, for example, killing all 
animals capable of suffering for food, clothing, research, or other human 
use were held suddenly to violate the animals’ rights, our current economy 
would, of course, collapse.297  The practical autonomy approach to rights 
seems to be a grudging concession to this problem and would have 
less immediate economic impact because it would only assign rights 
to particularly intelligent animals such as great apes and dolphins, which 
are typically not killed for food or clothing.298  However, assigning such 
rights would be perceived by many as a starting point for eventual 
broader assignment of rights to animals. 
Further, even assigning rights to particularly intelligent animals would 
inflict costs on scientific research and on the rights of some humans who 
already find their human rights too seldom respected.  John Marks notes 
that attitudes about rights for animals may be different depending on 
875 (2002) (noting Justice Anthony Kennedy’s reflection that “meaning is the life of 
language.” (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991))).
294. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 295. As noted by primatologist Frans de Waal, “[t]his is the reason that the animal 
rights movement’s outrageous parallel with the abolition of slavery—apart from being 
insulting—is morally flawed: slaves can and should become full members of society; 
animals cannot and will not.”  Frans B.M. de Waal, Editorial, We the People (and Other 
Animals) . . . , N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1999, at A21, available at http://www.emory.edu/ 
LIVING_LINKS/OurInnerApe/pdfs/WePeople.html.
296. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
297. See Cupp, supra note 9, at 11. 
298. See WISE, supra note 77, at 268.  Wise argues that when deciding the “best 
candidates to whom the dignity-rights to bodily integrity and bodily liberty might be 
extended,” that “[a]rguably the best place [to start] might be those species of animals 
evolutionarily closest to the three species that are most clearly entitled to fundamental legal 
rights: chimpanzees, bonobos, and ourselves.”  Id.  Wise spends three chapters making 
the case that along with their seeming capability to feel and exhibit self-consciousness, 
the intelligence and abilities of the chimpanzee and bonobo demand the extension of 
some basic rights.  Id.
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one’s wealth and location: “Ape rights is not a political movement in 
Central Africa or Indonesia, where human rights are sufficiently precarious.  
The ape rights movement is principally Euro-American.”299  He also 
points out that very poor humans in third world countries are the persons 
whose economic interests are most powerfully threatened by rights for 
primates.  The economic interests of the average New Yorker or Londoner 
“do not come into conflict with those of a chimpanzee.  The average 
Tanzanian’s economic interests, on the other hand, may well.”300  He 
continues:
The basic problem is the presumption that comes with a couch-potato argument 
for rights to Tanzanian chimpanzees, Rwandan gorillas, or Indonesian orangutans.  
Could you really look a group of Rwandans in the eye, with the horrors and 
brutalities on massive scales that they have had to endure, and tell them that a 
gorilla has got the same rights as them?  Personally, I couldn’t, but there are 
people who seem to think they could.301
Peter Carruthers concurs, going so far as to regard growing interest in 
animal rights “as a reflection of moral decadence,” and noting that “many in 
the West agonise over the fate of seal pups and cormorants while human 
beings elsewhere starve or are enslaved.”302
Regarding scientific research, assignment of rights would inflict significant 
costs on both humans and animals.  Use of animals in scientific research 
has been instrumental in most major medical advances in the past 
century.303  In addition to saving countless human lives, research using 
animals has also improved animals’ lives through advancements in 
veterinary medicine.304  According to a 1997 study by the United States 
Department of Agriculture, in ninety-two percent of animal research 
experiments the animal does not experience pain.305  However, if all 
 299. MARKS, supra note 121, at 193. 
300. Id.
301. Id.
 302. CARRUTHERS, supra note 273, at xi.
303. See NAT’L ASS’N FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, THE HUMANE CARE AND 
TREATMENT OF LABORATORY ANIMALS 1 (1999), http://www.nwabr.org/research/pdfs/ 
NABRHumane.pdf (“Virtually every major medical advance of the last century has 
depended upon research with animals.”); see also FOUND. FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH,
PROUD ACHIEVEMENTS OF ANIMAL RESEARCH 12–13 (6th ed. 2006), http://www.fbresearch. 
org/Portals/9/docs/ProudAchieve.pdf (listing medical advances in which animal research 
has been vital); New Jersey Association for Biomedical Research, Medical Milestones, 
http://www.njabr.org/programs/medical_milestones (last visited Feb. 3, 2009) (presenting a 
timeline of medical advances completed with the use of animal research). 
304. See NAT’L ASS’N FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, supra note 303, at 1–3. 
305. Id. at 2. 
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animals capable of suffering were given dignity rights, even experiments 
that do not involve pain could arguably be halted because the animals 
are not capable of consenting to the treatment.306  Even if only particularly 
intelligent animals were immediately assigned rights, many rights activists 
would see this as a mere stepping stone toward a broader assignment of 
rights to all animals capable of suffering; such a broad assignment of 
rights would cripple most scientific research involving animals.307
Further, even in the short term, assigning rights to particularly intelligent 
animals would destroy the ability to use many primates—the animals 
whose bodies are closest to human bodies—in research.308
To briefly note a final illustration of potential costs, assigning rights to 
research animals would limit scientists’ rights to expressive activity 
under the First Amendment.309  Scientific research may be a form of 
expression, and although the protection of that right of expression is not 
absolute, the repression of vitally important expressive activity must be 
considered when deciding whether to extend rights to animals. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Opposing rights for animals should carry with it an especially strong 
obligation to emphasize the moral and legal significance of humaneness 
toward animals.  Rejecting a rights paradigm for animals does not leave 
animals defenseless; indeed, accompanied by enhanced sensitivity to the 
evils of cruelty and neglect, it inures to animals’ ultimate benefit.  
Focusing on human responsibility may well be an appropriate reason to 
adopt many of the animal protections sought by rights activists, but the 
appropriate focus is on humans as responsible moral agents rather than 
on animals as bearers of rights. 
Indeed, a well-intentioned but misguided emphasis on rights diminishes
the focus on human responsibility, and de-emphasizing human responsibility 
ultimately would harm animals.  Animals’ welfare as influenced by humans 
is almost entirely in human hands.  Even if we incorporate animal rights 
 306. With estimates of chimpanzees’ reasoning abilities analogized to those of two- 
or three-year-old children, even intelligent species are not capable of giving consent. See
supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text. 
307. See Cupp, supra note 9, at 30–34. 
308. See id. at 42–46.
 309. For an analysis of scientific research as expressive activity subject to First 
Amendment protections, see Barry P. McDonald, Government Regulation or Other 
“Abridgements” of Scientific Research: The Proper Scope of Judicial Review Under the 
First Amendment, 54 EMORY L.J. 979, 984–86, 1087–91 (2005); Barry P. McDonald, 
The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to 
Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 254–58, 263–66 
(2004).
CUPP.UPDATEPRINTER 3/12/2009 10:11:24 AM
[VOL. 46:  27, 2009] Moving Beyond Animal Rights 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
 83
language, humans will decide how humanely animals will be treated.  
Acceptance of moral responsibility by humans for humaneness toward 
animals—or humaneness toward humans, for that matter—is in too-short 
supply.  In effect, telling humans through the courts that their moral 
responsibility is not particularly important in determining whether rights 
apply would not encourage humans to embrace greater moral responsibility.  
Rather, it would lessen emphasis on moral responsibility. 
Some animal rights activists argue that changing courts’ assignment of 
property status to animals—in other words, getting courts to assign rights to 
animals—is imperative for attaining proper protection of animals’ welfare.310
However, developments in recent years increasingly provide contrary 
evidence.
Despite the failure of animal rights arguments in American courts thus 
far, public interest in humane treatment of animals has probably never 
been stronger.  Animal welfare issues “are part of the public domain like 
never before.”311  To illustrate, the Animal Legal Defense Fund asserts 
that slightly over a decade ago only seven states had felony animal cruelty 
statutes.312  However, currently forty-one states have adopted felony 
cruelty statutes, with the three most recent additions—Kentucky, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming—joining the trend in March 2003.313
Public outcry over the recent Michael Vick animal cruelty case also 
illustrates this trend.  Rather than being overlooked due to his status as a 
football celebrity, Vick’s mistreatment of dogs caused national outrage 
and transformed him from a sports idol to a pariah.314  Americans 
310. See, e.g., Gary Francione, Reflections on Animals, Property, and the Law and 
Rain Without Thunder, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 39 (2007) (“[T]he equal 
consideration of animal interests necessarily requires the recognition that nonhumans 
have a right not to be treated as the property of humans.”). 
 311. Larry Copeland, Animal Rights Fight Gains Momentum: Groups Report 
Increase in Membership as High-Profile Incidents Make Headlines, USA TODAY, Jan. 
28, 2008, at 3A (quoting Michael Markarian, executive vice president of the Humane 
Society of the United States).
312. See Animal Legal Defense Fund, More States Join Anti-Cruelty Fight, 
http://www.aldf.org/article.php?id=331 (last visited Feb. 3, 2009). 
313. Id.
314. See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt, Vick Pleads Guilty in Dog-Fighting Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/27/sports/football/27cnd-vick.html 
(commenting that Vick’s sullied reputation in his business was made clear when “N.F.L. 
Commissioner Roger Goodell told Vick in a letter . . . that his actions were ‘cruel and 
reprehensible’ and that Vick’s involvement in gambling was a violation of the N.F.L.’s 
personal conduct policy”).  In an effort to reconcile, Vick stated the following: “I want to 
apologize to all the young kids out there for my immature acts . . . .  If I’m more disappointed 
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appropriately focused on anger toward Vick for his failure to properly 
care for the dogs under his control rather than on rights for the dogs.315
It seems doubtful that the same level of condemnation for this kind of 
breach of moral responsibility for animal welfare would have been applied 
to celebrities in earlier generations.  Other examples of an increasing 
recognition of responsibility abound.  Several states have enhanced or 
are in the process of enhancing prohibitions of cockfighting.316  In 2008, 
at least thirteen states were considering restrictions on “puppy mills” 
that breed dogs under inhumane conditions.317  At least three fast food 
chains use eggs produced by cage-free hens.318
None of these measures to enhance protection of animals from cruelty 
required an assignment of rights.  All of these measures called upon 
participants in the social contract to exercise reasonable responsibility.  
Ultimately, acceptance or rejection of moral responsibility by human 
bearers of rights, rather than an artificial construct of animals as bearers 
of rights, is what shall determine whether animals—as well as humans—
will be treated humanely. 
with myself than anything, it’s because of all the young people, young kids that I’ve let 
down, who look at Michael Vick as a role model.”  Jerry Markon & Jonathan Mummolo, 
Vick Pleads Guilty, Calls Dogfighting a ‘Terrible Thing,’ WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2007, at 
A1 (commenting that outside the N.F.L., Vick’s reputation was severely damaged).
315. See, e.g., Take a Bite Out of Vick, with a Dog Chew Toy: Company Selling 
Plastic Depiction of QB, Who Is Charged with Dogfighting, MSNBC.COM, Aug. 7, 2007, 
http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/20162029/ (noting that “those looking to vent their anger 
toward Atlanta Falcons quarterback Michael Vick” can purchase a chew toy in the 
likeness of Michael Vick in his uniform for their dogs); see also D. Orlando Ledbetter & 
Jeremy Redmon, Cheers, Jeers, Media Circus Surround Vick: Animal Rights Activists, 
Falcons Fans Turn Out to See Quarterback, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 27, 2007, at A10 
(noting that at Vick’s trial, there were angry protests outside the court house.  One 
animal rights activist comments that “[t]he intensity of the crowd and media here really 
demonstrates that [his conduct] has struck a chord with the American public.”). 
316. See Copeland, supra note 311. 
317. Id.
318. Id.
